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Showa 5 /T.N. 1930/

MINUTES OF COMMITTEE MEETING

PRIVY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

(Excerpts)

The First Meeting of the Investigation
Committee for the Ratification of the
London Naval Treaty of 1930
was held at the offices of the Privy Council
on 18 August (Monday), Showa 5 /1930/

Those present:

President KURATOMI
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee

Councillor KANEKO	Councillor DEN
Councillor KUBOTA	Councillor ARAI
Councillor YAMAKAWA	Councillor KAWAI
Councillor KURODA	Councillor MIZUMACHI

Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI
Secretary HORIE
Secretary MUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:05 P.M.)

Chairman ITO, after calling the meeting to order, stated that as this bill was an important bill which affected the national welfare, it was necessary to make a specially careful investigation of the bill, and that first, he wanted to determine the policy and order of the investigation in order that it might proceed in a satisfactory manner. He continued that the matters to be questioned would roughly be divided into seven items, for each of which a chief investigator would be appointed, who, after making a thorough investigation, would set a date, listen to the explanations of the authorities and ask questions. He further stated that he hoped that care would be taken not to allow the proceedings of the meeting to leak out.

Then the Chairman expressed thanks for the services of Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI who had exerted himself day after day to study this bill. Next, Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI made an explanation regarding the items to be questioned. Councillor KAWAI made an inquiry about the presentation of a memorial to the Throne by the Supreme War Council, and Chairman ITO gave his opinion on the matter. Councillor KANEKO spoke about questions relative to

the problem of the supreme command, and the Chairman expressed his views on the matter also.

President KURATOMI stated that his negotiation some time ago with the Prime Minister about the manner of presenting the written reply to the Throne was with the intention of advising its presentation as material necessary for the investigation. Then he explained the details.

Councillor KANEKO inquired whether the Government had asked the Council to carry out the investigation quickly even at the sacrifice of the summer vacation. President KURATOMI reported on the progress of the negotiations with the Cabinet since the receipt of the written Imperial Inquiry, and especially on the reply of the Cabinet as to whether it was necessary or not to carry out the investigation quickly.

Councillor KANEKO rejected the popular opinion that the present treaty should be ratified quickly in respect to international faith, and explained the internal circumstances under which the United States had ratified the treaty so promptly.

The Chairman next asked for the opinion of each councillor regarding the order of the investigation of this treaty. Councillors KAWAI and KURODA gave their opinions. The Chairman further referred his opinion to the council that as it was detrimental and useless for the State Ministers to be accompanied by so many unnecessary explainers to the committee meetings as has been the practice, he wanted, except when the presence of others was especially necessary, only the Premier and the Foreign and the Navy Ministers to attend the meetings for the investigation of this treaty. Councillors KANEKO and KUBOTA supported the proposal and it was decided as the Chairman proposed.

Chairman ITO, after giving the date and time of the next meeting, announced the meeting closed.

(The meeting was closed at 2:40 P.M.)

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The Second Meeting of the Investigation Committee

regarding the Ratification of the

London Naval Treaty of 1930

Held at the offices of the Privy Council

on 23 August (Saturday), SHOWA 5 /1930/

Those present:

President KIELTOMI
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KAMEKO	Councillor DEN
Councillor KUBOTA	Councillor ARAI
Councillor YAMAKAWA	Councillor KAWAI
Councillor KURODA	Councillor MIZUMACHI

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI
Navy Minister TANABE
Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI
Secretary HORIE
Secretary MUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:05 P.M.)

Chairman ITO declared the meeting open, and asked for the explanation of the authorities regarding this draft. The Prime Minister explained, in regard to the London Naval Treaty of 1930, the history of the Naval Arms Limitation Conference, the purpose of the London Conference, the progress of the Conference, and the outline of the treaty. He also stated that he hoped the treaty would come into effect gradually from SHOWA 6 /1931/. Supplementing the explanation of the Premier, the Foreign Minister explained further in detail. The Navy Minister also explained from the expert's standpoint the gist of our counter-measures to meet the conference and the regulations regarding our armament set by the treaty; and stated that he had concluded

the treaty as it was deemed necessary to determine the general outline of their and our armament at this juncture, although the content of the treaty was of course not satisfactory. After that the Chairman requested the Ministers to retire.

(All Ministers retired.)

Then discussion was begun within the committee. The opinion was voiced that regarding the problem of the deficiency of our armed strength, the attendance of KTO, ex-chief of the Naval General Staff, should be requested through the Navy Minister. Regarding questions, it was decided that questions about facts would be given preference.

Committee Chairman ITO declared the meeting closed.

(The meeting was closed at 2:50 P.M.)

The Third Meeting of the Investigation Committee
regarding the Ratification of the
London Naval Treaty of 1930

Held at the offices of the Privy Council
on 26 August (Tuesday), Showa 5 /1930/

Those present:

President KURATOMI
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KANEKO	Councillor DEN
Councillor KUBOTA	Councillor ARAI
Councillor YAMAKAWA	Councillor KATAI
Councillor KURODA	Councillor MIZUMACHI

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI
Navy Minister TAKARABE
Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

Chief Secretary FUJIMAKI
Secretary HORIE
Secretary MUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:05 P.M.)

Councillor KANEKO said that according to the press a certain State Minister had made remarks that seemed to indicate hostility toward the Privy Council. This was a matter for great regret, since it ran counter to the Imperial Command of Emperor Meiji, but the Council had no intention of interfering with the accomplishment of the Cabinet's policies. Its sole intention was to obey the Imperial Command, and he requested that questions be answered without reserve. He then continued that he wanted to know why the Cabinet was in such a hurry for the ratification of this treaty as to wish the committee to investigate it even in the midst of the hot season during the time when vacations had been granted. To this question, the Foreign Minister made an answer.

Councillor KANEKO queried again whether in case Ireland would not ratify the treaty, it could not be carried into effect, and stated that it was only for the convenience of her domestic administration that the United States had finished its ratification without delay. He asked about the circumstances which had led the Japanese plenipotentiaries to go to England via America in answer to an invitation from the United States and received a reply from the Foreign Minister.

Then the same Councillor asked whether it was true that Plenipotentiary TAKARABE, prior to his departure, had invited in members of both Houses of the Diet and others, had explained the so-called Three Main Principles, and had stated that Japan's minimum military strength should be 70% of that of the United States. The Navy Minister replied in the affirmative.

The Councillor then asked whether it was true that Plenipotentiary WAKATSUKI had also declared at San Francisco that Japan's minimum military strength must be 70% of that of the United States. The Foreign Minister made a reply, but the Councillor not being satisfied demanded an explanation of Plenipotentiary WAKATSUKI about the matter. The same Councillor further asked about the facts of the negotiations concerning the "70%" problem between STIMSON, Ambassador DEBUCHI, and Plenipotentiaries WAKATSUKI and TAKARABE, and whether the so-called compromise had been agreed upon at the meeting of MATSUDAIRA and REED. The Foreign Minister answered in detail.

Then, the Councillor queried whether the rumor was true that no consultation had been held with Admiral ABO until the aforesaid compromise had been made. The Navy Minister replied in the negative. The Councillor inquired, furthermore, as to the authenticity of the fact that when the compromise among Japan, Britain and the United States was concluded, Admiral ABO, being astonished at the quantitative equality in submarines had stressed the necessity on the part of Japan of maintaining the present amount, but that Plenipotentiary WAKATSUKI had said it was already too late to amend the compromise. The Foreign Minister replied to this.

Then, the Councillor demanded to be shown the whole text of the telegram which, he heard, had been sent from Plenipotentiary TAKARABE to Vice Navy Minister YAMANASHI with instructions to "introduce the opinion of the Navy General Staff about the compromise to the Cabinet," at the time of Plenipotentiary WAKATSUKI's requested instructions on whether or not to accept the compromise plan; he also demanded to be shown the secret documents, if any, as such seemed to be in existence from what had been discussed in the U. S. Upper House. To this, the Navy and Foreign Ministers answered respectively.

Furthermore, the Councillor inquired whether it was true that Premier HAMAGUCHI replied in the House of Peers: "I will not refer to what Articles XI and XII of the Constitution signify, because even the scholars have different opinions about them." The Prime Minister first explained the reason

why the Cabinet was in such a hurry to make this investigation during the hot season, and then, replied that he had thought it proper to withhold the answer on the constitutional interpretation, since it was not directly concerned with the London Treaty.

Then, the Councillor requested to be shown the formal texts of the transmitted documents of the direct appeals to the Throne, and of the memorials to the Throne as regards the disposition of matters concerning military strength.

Councillor KAWAI argued that it was utterly incomprehensible that the Japanese Plenipotentiaries, despite their declaration before their departure, asked for instructions, giving up the Three Main Principles, and that the Navy General Staff had approved. And he asked the Navy Minister for his opinion on the establishment of a Navy Minister's Administrative Office, and inquired whether it was true that at a meeting of the Supreme War Council it had been agreed not to set up the Navy Minister's Administrative Office in the future. To this inquiry, the Navy Minister stated that he had not considered that a slight diminution in Japan's holding of military strength from 70% of that of the United States would render impossible the concluding of the treaty, and he had presented the memorial to the Throne as regards the disposition of matters concerning military strength. The Prime Minister raised the question as to whether the investigation of the connection between the direct appeal to the Throne and the Cabinet which Councillor KANEKO had requested, must cover the whole period from the beginning of the Meiji Era to the present day. Councillor KANEKO replied it would be enough to have the titles of the documents which had been transmitted to the Cabinet from Meiji 43 /1910/ onward.

Then Councillor KAWAI requested that the confidential instructions to the Japanese Plenipotentiaries be produced. After this was done, Chairman ITO declared the meeting closed.

(The meeting was closed at 4:50 P.M.)

The Fourth Meeting of the Investigation Committee
regarding the Ratification of the
London Naval Treaty of 1930

Held at the offices of the Privy Council
on 28 August (Thursday), Showa 5 /1930/

Those present:

President of the Privy Council KURATOMI
Vice President of the Privy Council HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KANEKO
Councillor YAMAKITA
Councillor KURODA

Councillor DEN
Councillor ARAI
Councillor KAWAI
Councillor MIZUMACHI

Absent: Councillor KUBOTA

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI
Navy Minister TAKARABE
Foreign Minister SUDEHARA

Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI
Secretary HORIE
Secretary MUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:00 P.M.)

The Chairman of the Committee, ITO, called the meeting to order.

Councillor KANEKO charged that it is very unfortunate that the former as well as the present Cabinet regards the Privy Council as an enemy, and added that according to the newspapers the Administrative Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, MAGAI, in his speech at the oratorical meeting of the MINSEI TO held at Hibiya Public Hall on August 20th, stated as follows: "If the Privy Council interferes with the ratification of the London Treaty, which the Cabinet intends to conclude for the sake of promoting international peace and to lighten the national burden, we must fight them as the public enemy of our nation."

The Councillor further said that according to an article in the Japan Times, he /NAGAI/ stated: "Such superannuated men as the Privy Councillors are unnecessary to a modern nation," and then asked whether this was true or not. Regarding this, the Foreign Minister replied, "I think that the speech and statement of Mr. NAGAI were probably not truly reported." Thereupon Councillor KANEKO requested the facts be ascertained directly from Vice Minister NAGAI, to which the Foreign Minister agreed. Then the same Councillor asked why Japan doesn't join the Continental Group and do as Italy and France have done. To this, the Foreign Minister gave his answer.

The Councillor further denounced the Cabinet by stating that though the Foreign Minister says that the treaty was rather a success, a look at the minutes of the United States Senate will show that it was argued that this treaty would make Japan look on with hands tied until the U. S., which at present has only two heavy cruisers, constructed fifteen of them. Could the Cabinet still hold its view of diplomatic success, he questioned, and continued that while the strength of forces in the U. S. was decided by the President, and that in Japan by His Majesty with the assistance of the Supreme Command, in spite of this, the present Cabinet, assuming an attitude as if to assist and decide by itself, has signed such a treaty which is disadvantageous to our country and advantageous to the U. S.; and citing the minutes of the U. S. Senate, where it was said in ridicule: "Hats off to the Japanese," he emphasized the fact that our diplomacy had blundered in concluding this treaty. In reply, the Foreign Minister endeavored to explain.

Changing his point, the Councillor asked a further question regarding the regulations governing the replacement of U. S. cruisers and pointed out that the abolition of destroyers and submarines was exceedingly disadvantageous to our country as compared with the U. S. The Councillor inquired again why this country had agreed on such a treaty under these circumstances, and demanded a detailed explanation with regard to the relations between Britain and America at the London Conference. The Foreign Minister replied respectively to these queries.

The Chairman of the Committee, ITO, inquired about the SAITO-CRAIGIE parley and the Foreign and Navy Ministers answered respectively in this connection.

Then Councillor KURODA stated his desire to know the relation between the Cabinet and the Privy Council, and called the attention of the Cabinet to the fact that there were many errors and omissions in diplomatic documents submitted for Imperial approval since the formation of the present Cabinet (this treaty being a conspicuous example) which would annoy the Throne and mislead the general public. Therefore, said the Councillor, pointing out actual examples, the Cabinet should investigate the causes to avoid such mistakes in the future. The Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister expressed their regret for the lapses and gave assurances that they would be careful in the future.

Councillor KAMEKO criticized the Foreign Minister, saying that the remark he made laying the blame on the ill workmanship of the photogravure was without reason. There followed questions and answers between the Foreign Minister and the Councillor regarding this.

After this, Committee Chairman ITO stated that it was very regrettable that there are various propaganda-like rumors concerning this Committee, and so saying he declared the meeting closed for the day.

An inquiry was made by Councillor DEN concerning the dual complement of warship personnel, to which the Navy Minister answered.

(The meeting was adjourned at 3:30 P.M.)

The Fifth Meeting of the Investigation Committee
regarding the Ratification of the
London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Held at the offices of the Privy Council
on 1 September (Monday), SHOWA 5 /1930/

Those present:

President KURATONI
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KAMEKO	Councillor DEN
Councillor KUBOTA	Councillor ARAI
Councillor YAMAKAWA	Councillor KAWAI
Councillor KURODA	Councillor MIZUMACHI

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI
Navy Minister TAKARABE
Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI
Secretary HORIE
Secretary MUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:00 P.M.)

Committee Chairman ITO announced the opening of the Conference, and stating that there had been an omission in the answer to Councillor KURODA's question in the previous meeting, asked how the erroneously written passages in the text of the treaty should be dealt with. A statement was also made by Councillor KURODA on the purport of this inquiry, to which the Foreign Minister replied. Councillor KAWAI inquired about the procedure by which the instructions to the Imperial Plenipotentiaries were decided, and the Navy Minister answered this.

The same Councillor further inquired what induced the Navy Minister to submit to the Throne the matter regarding the disposition of armed forces and to ask for Imperial sanction when there was already an established usage, to

which question the Navy Minister replied that it was because that matter had become a problem in the Special Session of the Diet after the London Disarmament Conference, breeding various arguments among the military authorities also. Subsequently the same Councillor said that he considered the Prime Minister, who had been the Navy Minister's Administrative Officer at that time, as not having conformed to the said usage; and asked the Navy Minister what he thought of it. The Navy Minister replied that after his return to Japan he had carefully inquired of the persons responsible on that matter, and it was concluded that there had been nothing wrong in the procedure taken by the said Administrative Officer at that time.

Further, Councillor KAWAI inquired as to the reason for the many changes of post in the Naval General Staff, including the Vice Chief of Staff, to which the Navy Minister replied. Subsequently, the same Councillor requested a detailed explanation regarding the situation which led to the replacement of the Navy Chief of Staff, to which the Navy Minister stated that he regretted very much receiving questions based on newspaper articles, and further explained that Admiral KATO himself regretted what he had done at the time he was asked for instructions, and had tendered his resignation with the reason that he could not bear the thoughts of self-reproach for not having stated his opinion positively. He, the Navy Minister, had thereupon reported the change of post to the Throne. The same Councillor also stated that it could be interpreted that when Admiral KATO submitted his resolution to resign to the Throne on the grounds that he could not do justice to the independence of the Supreme Command, he was commanded to resign, and asked whether it was so. The Navy Minister replied that it was true that he had submitted his papers at the time he reported his resignation to the Throne but changes in the posts had not been made by it.

The Councillor further stated that he had heard that Vice Admiral SAKONJI, with the consent of Plenipotentiary TAKARABE, had sent a wire to Vice Navy Minister YAMAWASHI telling him to be prepared for a break-down when sending instructions; and after the instructions were dispatched the Navy Chief of Staff had also sent a secret telegram to Plenipotentiary TAKARABE. The Councillor demanded the telegraphic message be presented. The Navy Minister explained the circumstances at the time the telegram from London was received and, saying that he had by no means sent the telegram in betrayal of his colleagues, gave a summary of the telegram from the Navy Chief of Staff.

Regarding the Councillor's question as to whether Plenipotentiary TAKARABE did or did not know that Chief of Staff KATO had opposed the military strength of the requested plan, the Navy Minister replied that he did not think he /KATO/ would oppose it to the extent of risking a breakdown. To this, the same Councillor reprovingly asked why the Plenipotentiary did not confirm the intentions of the Navy Chief of Staff, and the same Minister replied that at the Navy Minister's Administrative Officer was in Tokyo he had not thought it necessary for TAKARABE, who was only a plenipotentiary, to confirm the said Chief's intentions. Then he read the telegram from the Navy Chief of Staff, dispatched on 2 April.

At this time, Committee Chairman ITO demanded the presentation of the telegram read by the Navy Minister, but the Minister replied that he would answer after consideration.

Councillor ARAI questioned on some doubtful points in regard to the tonnage of heavy cruisers of Japan and America as brought out by the Navy Minister in the last committee meeting, and moreover asked whether or not the Navy Minister's Administrative Officer and the Chief of the Naval General Staff agreed in their opinion on the military strength at the time the instructions were dispatched, and also, whether or not they considered it necessary to agree on their opinion.

To these questions, the Navy Minister and the Prime Minister gave detailed replies. The Prime Minister, as a rule, would withhold his comment, but regarding the plans for instructions, he replied that the agreement of the opinion of both parties was necessary, and added that both had arrived at an agreement.

Next, Councillor KAWAI asked why OKADA, a member of the Supreme War Council, accompanied the Navy Chief of Staff, and why he didn't clarify the statement of the Chief of Staff when there were vague points in his replies; and to this, the Prime Minister answered that at the time he had met both parties, Mr. OKADA, speaking as a representative, stated: "The situation has become unavoidable. The naval experts' views will be given later by Vice Minister YAMINASHI, but if the conference is going to conclude this treaty as it is, we must study the best method possible."

Mr. KATO replied: "As for the Naval General Staff, this would cause difficulty in the military operations and tactics, but, if this present treaty is decided upon, we will endeavor with our best efforts to carry it out."

Councillor KANEKO pointed out that the fact that the Emperor decided upon the strength of forces is clearly stated in the Japanese Constitution, and asked why a Staff meeting was not held in order to decide on the military strength in accordance with the treaty. To this, the Prime Minister replied that they had followed what had become the customary procedure since the Washington Conference, and stated that since all the supreme powers belonged to the Emperor, an advisory organ by no means infringed upon the sovereign power. Here, the said Councillor explained the reason for providing Article 11 in the Constitution, and stating that the determination of the military strength is the most important of the Imperial prerogatives, said that the Cabinet cannot arbitrate on the matter. To this, the Prime Minister replied that although in form, the military strength can be determined only by the Cabinet, the military strength provided in the treaty had been decided after having obtained the approval of the Navy Chief of Staff. Then Committee Chairman ITO stated that the disregard of the Navy Chief of Staff's opinion was already being much talked about, and so that point must be well investigated, and if what the Prime Minister said was true, it is vastly different from the rumor that are going around. He then adjourned the meeting.

(The meeting was closed at 4:10 P.M.)

The Sixth Meeting of the Investigation Committee
regarding the Ratification of the
London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Held at the Offices of the Privy Council
on 3 September (Wednesday), SHOWA 5 /1930/

Those present:

President KURATOMI
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee; Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KANEKO	Councillor ARAI
Councillor KUBOTA	Councillor KAWAI
Councillor YAMAKAWA	Councillor MIZUMACHI
Councillor KURODA	

Absent: Councillor DEN

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI
Navy Minister TAKARABE
Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI
Secretary HORIE
Secretary MUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:00 P.M.)

Chairman ITO announced the opening of the meeting.

Councillor KANEKO stated that he had heard that Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs NAGAI who had abused the Privy Council in his public speech was going to make a two months trip to China, and demanded that the said Councillor be ordered to postpone his departure until the questions raised by said Councillor the other day were settled.

The Foreign Minister answered that he had asked NAGAI about the matter, but that NAGAI had replied that he had never abused the Privy Council, that he had only said that as it was absolutely necessary to conclude the Naval Treaty, we had to fight against any statesmen who tried to prevent the conclusion of the said treaty. The Foreign Minister continued that NAGAI had also said that he had been quite surprised at the articles in the foreign-language newspapers. Then Councillor KANEKO made a request for the withdrawal of the said account from the various newspapers. The Foreign Minister replied that the Government did not have a newspaper account retracted each time they found mistakes in it, and that he did not think it necessary to take such measures in this case. The said Councillor, however, insisted upon its withdrawal, explaining that with the publication of such an account in the newspapers, not only the people would naturally come to bear bad feelings against the Privy Council, but that the account was also very prejudicial to the maintenance of amicable relations between the Privy Council and the Foreign Ministry.

Councillor KUSOTA asked for the control of such persons as would take advantage of matters relative to the Throne for party movements. He also recommended that the article on NAGAI's speech be caused to be withdrawn. Chairman ITO also expressed his desire that the Government should take a moderate view in the matter, and announced his wish to begin the discussion of the main subjects.

Councillor KAWAI asked what the Premier meant when he answered in the Lower House that the Government would be solely responsible for national defense. The Premier answered that he had just replied that it was unnecessary to discuss in the Diet the details of the negotiations between the military administration organization and the military command organization; and that as the Navy General Staff was not responsible to the outside, the Government would be responsible. The said Councillor again asked on what grounds the Premier had, regardless of the objection of the military, decided that the military strength decided upon by the Treaty was sufficient for our national defense; and what he meant when he said that the strength decided upon by the present agreement was only a part of our country's military strength. The said Councillor continued to ask about the authority possessed by the Chief of the Navy General Staff; and how the Premier could say, with a military strength of which the Chief of the Navy General Staff did not approve, that our national defense was secure. The Premier replied to each of these questions.

Then the same Privy Councillor asked whether the above-mentioned plan of instructions in response to a request had been drafted by the Naval General Staff or not, and why the plan had been made the last one in spite of the fact that our plenipotentiary had often reported that it was not to be the last plan. The Premier answered each question and stated that it was due to the fact that he had been informed by the plenipotentiary that it was hopeless to expect the other parties to concede any further. Then the same Councillor said that he was told that the Navy Minister's administrative officer was heard to say, when he saw the Chief of the Navy General Staff on 27 March, that there was no other way for him but to decide the matter by himself, if

the Chief of the Navy General Staff persisted to the end in his disagreement. The Councillor asked how it was possible that such a thing could have been said. The Councillor asked again whether or not on the same occasion the Premier had petitioned the Emperor to convene a meeting of the Supreme War Council. The Premier answered that he had only expressed his own feeling about the matter and that he had not petitioned the Emperor to call the Supreme War Council meeting. The same Councillor continuing further said that he wanted to ask the Premier the reason why the latter could say that there was no other way but to decide the matter by himself. The Premier repeated his former answer and said that he had only expressed his own feelings. Whereupon, the same Councillor demanded to know how it happened that the Premier came to feel like that and stated definitely that the Premier was wrong in concluding that the Navy Chief of Staff had agreed with him. To this, the Premier explained in detail the situation at the time and stated the circumstances in which he had concluded that the Navy Chief of Staff had agreed with him. However, the same Councillor asked whether he had not been too hasty in interpreting the behavior of the Navy Chief of Staff as agreement. The Premier insisted that it was not unreasonable.

After this the same Councillor pointed out that the Premier's explanation in the Privy Council was quite different from that which he had made in the Diet where he had stated that the Government held the right to decide military strength. The Premier answered that he had not stated that the Government held the right of decision, but he had only said that the matter of concluding treaties should be decided by the Cabinet. He answered also that he could not state the scope and extent to which he took the military's opinion into consideration, as this was a confidential matter. Whereupon, the same Councillor asked how the Premier could explain that agreement had been reached when the matter required agreement by the military. The Premier explained that it was because he had thought that the military had had no objection after all.

Councillor KANEKO asked the Premier the reason why he had stated in the Imperial Diet that he had respected the military's opinion and taken it into consideration, instead of saying that the military had agreed with him. As the Premier answered that it was not necessary to have gone so far as to say that he had obtained their consent, the same Councillor voiced the opinion that the question had come up because the Premier had not said that he had obtained their consent, and that the Councillor considered it most incomprehensible why the Government had had to say particularly that it had taken the opinion of the military into consideration in deciding the matter.

The Premier explained that it was because he had thought that the question of what the ideas of the Army and Navy General Staffs were should not be made an object of discussion in the Diet. The same Councillor said that he would conclude his questioning on this point, although he was not satisfied with this reply.

Then Councillor KATAI asked the Premier why, in spite of the fact that the opinion of the Navy General Staff ought not to be violated by others, it seemed, according to the Premier's reply, as though it were a consultative organ

of the Government. The Premier replied that it was not.

Privy Councillor ARAI, after making introductory remarks that he would ask about the same thing once more as it was a serious matter, asked for corroboration as to whether or not the Premier thought that the agreement of the Chief of the Navy General Staff was necessary in deciding military strength. The Premier replied that he thought that he would consider anything proposed by the Navy Minister as having been approved by the Chief of the Navy General Staff, because the Premier thought that the Minister's opinion would be in conformity with that of his Chief of Staff. The same Councillor asked what if the Minister did not agree with the Navy Chief of Staff? The Premier replied that they should be made to confer until they came to an agreement. The same Councillor asked whether it was not necessary for the Premier in such a case to consider it his duty to deal with the matter /T.N. only/ after having persuaded them to agree. The Premier replied that a discordant opinion would not be brought to the Premier. The same Councillor wanted to know if the Premier considered that the Navy Minister and the Navy Chief of Staff should agree concerning the measures to be taken on matters having to do with military strength. The Premier replied in the affirmative.

The Chairman of the Committee, ITO, explained in detail about the progress and the facts of the negotiations between the Navy Minister's Administrative Officer and the Chief of the Navy General Staff as he found that the Premier's reply was very different from what he had heard concerning the question of the agreement of the Navy Chief of Staff, and he could not make out the situation.

The Chairman said that he hoped that the Premier and the Navy Minister would make efforts in regard to the attendance of the former Navy Chief of Staff in order to solve the problem, and to assist the progress of the conference. Councillor KURODA expressed his agreement with the proposal. Then the Chairman of the Committee stated that the Premier might give his answer the next day after consultation. The Premier replied that he would answer after due consideration. He explained also that although he had been informed of the direct appeal to the Throne, his opinion might differ from that of the Chief of Staff in the matter of the interpretation of their lack of agreement to which he had referred.

Committee Chairman ITO stated that he had heard that the Chief of the Naval General Staff had never expressed his concurrence. To this, the Premier explained that he had never said that the former Chief of Staff had agreed, but that he had only concluded that after all there had been no objection.

The Chairman of the Committee ITO declared the meeting closed.

(The meeting was closed at 4:20 P.M.)

The Seventh Meeting of the Investigation Committee
regarding the Ratification of the
London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Held at the Offices of the Privy Council
on 5 September (Friday), SHOWA 5 /1930/

Those present:

President KURATOMI
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KANEKO	Councillor ARAI
Councillor KUBOTA	Councillor KAWAI
Councillor YAMAKAWA	Councillor MIZUMACHI
Councillor KURODA	

Absent: Councillor DEN

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI
Navy Minister TAKARABE

Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI
Secretary HORIE
Secretary MUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:05 P.M.)

Committee Chairman ITO called the meeting to order, and read the Prime Minister's answer (refusal) to the recommendation for the attendance of the former Navy Chief of Staff.

Councillor KANEKO brought up the point that at the Diet the Premier had answered that he had taken the military's opinion into consideration, while here at the Privy Council the Premier had answered that he had obtained their approval. Moreover, the Premier had explained that the reason why he had not answered to the same effect in the Diet as here was because the matter touched on the internal relations between the military and the civil government. However, Councillor KANEKO said, he proposed to ask why "taking into consideration" was all right and "obtaining approval" was all wrong. He then shifted his questioning to inquire why the provisory clause of Article 23 of this

treaty was put in. The Navy Minister answered that as it was indicated through this clause that we have not renounced our claim which was not approved by America and Britain, it would at least give spiritual strength to Japan in making her claim at the next conference. The Premier also answered that as it was feared that this treaty would pave the way to restricting Japan's heavy cruiser strength to 60% of that of America, we have specially provided this clause, and thereby have shown clearly that at the next naval conference the attitude of the different countries is not to be restricted in any way by the provisions of this treaty.

The said Councillor KANEKO argued that it was a fundamental principle of international law that no independent country could be restricted by a treaty after its expiration, and so it was not necessary to make such a provision. Therefore, it was an extreme sophistry on the part of our plenipotentiaries to say that the insertion of this clause was an achievement. To this the Prime Minister made some explanation, but the said Councillor again asserted that this provision was only an excuse and that any kind of assertion that might lead to the expansion of armaments could not by any means be permitted in the future.

The Premier then argued that although it was not yet decided whether or not Japan would make claims based on the so-called three great principles at the next naval conference, even if that claim should be made, it would not always mean an expansion of armaments, for the reason that if light cruisers and destroyers were to some extent to be decreased and heavy cruisers and submarines to be increased in the same amount, there would be no increase in the total.

Whereupon, the said Councillor further gave his firm opinion that by this treaty the United States of America had attained its object of limiting Japanese heavy cruisers and submarines and under such circumstances, such a provision would, of course, be of no use at the next conference.

Then the Navy Minister explained that the American plenipotentiary was inclined to be over-enthusiastic over 8-inch cruisers, although from the technical view-point 6-inch cruisers are not always inferior to 8-inch cruisers; and as to the merits of submarines there was no definite theory.

Then Councillor KAWAI asked to be allowed to speak, stating that he desired to bring the questions he had been asking for some time now to a conclusion, but as the Chairman said that there would be a further chance of reviewing the questions some other day, the said Councillor stated that it was simply beyond his comprehension that the Navy Minister should say in his reply in the House of Peers that the age when the strength of force determines all had already passed, and advocate that the most important point as regards armaments lay in keeping them in a perfect state at all times. He argued that Japan's armaments should be based upon the possibility of a crisis in the peace of the Orient with America or other Third Powers intervening in Sino-Japanese relations over rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, and demanded to know the Government's opinion on the matter.

To this, the Premier replied that it was a fact that the ratio of strengths, vis a vis America, provided in this treaty would become more unfavorable for Japan the nearer we got to 1936, and therefore it would be quite natural that he /Councillor KAWAI/ should worry about Japan's national defense, provided that it was interpreted in a narrow sense, but the Premier continued, he believed that friendly relations with other Powers, financial adjustments and other such matters were likewise the essentials of national defense. Therefore, although he too was dissatisfied with some phases of the national defense he was determined to put up with the present state of things for the time being; and although we would have to bear with the unfavorable ratio till the end of 1936, we would be able to build ships from the beginning of 1937, and so we had better make preparations within the scope admitted by the treaty. If we commenced our ship-building simultaneously with the expiration of the treaty terms, we would soon be able to hold 70% as against America; and finally the Premier asserted that it was a groundless fear that America would raise trouble in China, taking advantage of the period when the ratio would be low for our country.

Councillor KAWAI then stated that it would be a very good thing if our claims were accepted at the next conference, but that this was a matter of great doubt and in case our claims were not accepted it would be most probable that the treaty would remain as a virtually permanent restraint, that though he would not say that America would necessarily raise trouble in China, he believed that efforts should always be made to perfect armaments upon the grounds that such things might happen. To this remark, the Premier answered that the reason why the Government had signed the treaty despite some dissatisfaction with it was because the treaty was short-termed, and hence the Government did not think the ratio would be a permanent one.

Next, Councillor YAMAKAWA asked how much burden would, in reality, be lightened by the conclusion of the present treaty, which estimate the Government should have already made as a matter of course. The Premier stated in reply that study of the question of the replenishment of military strength was under way in military quarters. He regretted that he could not give even a general idea of it, except that the estimated amount for the ship-building plan already decided upon was 500 million yen in the budget for 1930, out of which 400 million yen would become financial resources both for the replenishment of military strength and for the diminution of burdens. The percentage for the two, however, was still uncertain, but he asserted, he would allot a part of it to the diminution of burdens without fail.

Thereupon, the said Councillor stated that he had heard that it was the view of the highest naval staff officers that the navy would be insufficient for national defense even if the ship-building rights as recognized by the present treaty should be fully exercised. If that should be true, as the tonnage of ships which Japan was authorized to build by the end of Showa 11 /1936/ was 106,000 tons and the estimated expenditure therefor was about 330 million yen, the remainder would be only 70 million yen, and consequently if the replacement expenditure should be added there would be no surplus. On the contrary, a considerable deficit would arise. However, the press had said nothing about the

fact that the present treaty would necessitate such a large sum of money, and the Premier's explanation was completely beyond his comprehension. Thereupon, the Premier gave assurances that, despite the fact that if the building right were fully exercised the amount would surpass 300 million yen, the right would be exercised appropriately in view of financial conditions. The said Councillor further contended that financial matters which would result from the conclusion of the treaty should of course be estimated before the signing of the treaty, and the same thing could be said of the replacement plan. However, if the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff had not yet made the replacement plan, it could be nothing but the neglect of duty on the part of the authorities concerned. Then the Navy Minister responded that the replacement plan was being studied by the Navy Ministry and the Naval General Staff, but unless an agreement could be reached between the two and prior to consultation with the Finance Ministry, the matter could not be presented. On this point Councillor YAMAKAWA bitterly criticized the authorities concerned for not already having a complete plan and said that it was incomprehensible that it should not be presented at this time.

Then Councillor KUBOTA stated that he thought the question just raised by Councillor YAMAKAWA was extremely important, that the fundamental object of the present treaty was to lighten the burden of the nation, and consequently unless the effect of the conclusion of the treaty in regard to this point was studied it ought not to have been possible for it to have been signed at such a conference. He requested the authorities concerned to make a reply centering around this point.

Then Chairman ITO, stating that the other remaining questions would be left to the next meeting, declared the meeting adjourned.

(The meeting was adjourned at 3:30 P.M.)

The Eighth Meeting of the Investigation Committee
regarding the Ratification of the
London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Held at the Offices of the Privy Council
on 8 September (Monday), SHOWA 5 /1930/

Those present:

President KURATOMI
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KAMEKO
Councillor KUBOTA
Councillor YAMAKATA

Councillor KURODA
Councillor ARAI
Councillor KAWAI
Councillor MIZUMACHI

Absent: Councillor DEN

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI
Navy Minister TAKARABE
Foreign Minister SHIDEMURA

Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI
Secretary HORIE
Secretary HUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:00 P.M.)

Chairman of the Committee ITO called the meeting to order.

Councillor KURODA asked what was the basis upon which the naval strength stipulated for each country in the present treaty was agreed upon. The Navy Minister replied that the existing naval strength was taken as the basis in the Washington Conference and that our country made the existing strength our basis in the Geneva Conference also; that it could be said that in the latest conference although both Britain and the United States advocated parity, Britain generally made the existing naval strength as the basis, while the United States, too, made the existing strength in a broad sense as the basis, and Japan also used the existing strength as the basis in a general way. Thereupon the Councillor calculated the tonnage which the United States should possess on the basis of Japan's existing strength and also pointed out the tonnage which Japan

should possess in case the existing strength of the United States is taken as the standard. Then he asked the reason why our country had agreed to a ratio of strength which was very unfavorable to our country and was content with a result which was tantamount to the annihilation already of numerous warcraft without engaging in a single battle. The Navy Minister replied that, although we need not be shy at all from the standpoint of right, the Japanese Government, since the Washington Conference, had been satisfied with the ratio of 70% as against the United States, and since its instructions for the London Conference were based on the rate of 70% against the United States in total tonnage, the agreement was made accordingly.

Next, the same Councillor, after explaining the spirit of disarmament in the KELLOGG Treaty, which Delegate WAKATSUKI had referred to in his speech at Seattle, U.S.A., asked whether it was not inconsistent with this spirit that the installation of taking off and landing equipment for aircraft on 25% of the cruisers was newly approved in the present treaty, and he asked to know what attitude and means our delegates had taken against it. The Navy Minister confessed that it would have been simple if we had followed the KELLOGG Pact, but that we had agreed upon the strong insistence of the United States.

The same Councillor then inquired of the Prime Minister why the authorities concerned had signed such a treaty as this one which would cause a defect in our national defense, and what counter-measures the authorities had to remedy this defect. The Prime Minister answered that absolutely no defect would be allowed to occur in our national defense, as he believed that, although there might be a deficiency from the standpoint of operational tactics with only the naval strength permitted by the treaty, this could be supplemented by other naval strength outside of the restrictions. He explained that there would be various ways for supplementing the naval strength: One way would be the repletion of the substance, and the other would be the improvement of strategy, but that its practical plan was now under consideration by the departments and bureaus of the Navy Ministry and was not yet in a stage for announcement.

Councillor KAWAI said that, although it was said that submarines were not so effective as they were believed to be by the public, he thought they were most necessary and effective to a country possessing topography, national traits and economic conditions like our country. Stating that he could not understand the reason why submarines were being replaced by airplanes which had an entirely different capacity, he asked for the views of the Navy Minister. The Navy Minister explained that he had only said that opinions did not necessarily agree as to the fighting value of submarines. After comparing the capacity of submarines and airplanes, he explained the merits and demerits of the two and declared that the future of airplanes was becoming more and more promising. To this, the same Councillor argued that the Navy Minister's words might have the result of repudiating the operational plans of the Imperial Navy. He said that the United States was extremely afraid of the submarines of the Japanese Navy which had made great progress since the Great

War, and expressed the view that so long as our country maintained the existing naval strength, the United States would surely not dare to fight our country. He then asked the Navy Minister if the latter was confident of success in regaining in the next conference the submarine strength which had been lost in the latest conference. The Navy Minister replied that our Naval General Staff had decided to make up for the shortage of submarines by airplanes, and that utmost efforts would be made in the next conference to raise the ratio against the United States, although there were no great prospects of success.

Next, the same Councillor said that the ratio against the United States would fall below 70% in 1936, that it was very clear that a time would come when it would become very disadvantageous to our country even if we gained the ratio of 70% in the conference of 1935; and that, generally speaking, he believed the essence of national defense lies in being prepared for emergencies with standing armaments and not to be exposed to danger even for half a day. He asked to hear the views of the Navy Minister on this matter. Then he said that there would be a great difference in competition for warship construction between the present time and the year 1936, asserting that it was needless to say that Japan would be left far behind the United States if competition was started after the naval strength had been once repleted. He asked to hear the Navy Minister's views on this point.

The Navy Minister replied that if the treaty failed to be concluded, then the United States would be hostile to Japan and there would be no guarantee that she would not undertake direct competition with our country in warship construction; that although the ratio against the United States in the 8-inch gun cruiser class would fall to 60% and the cruisers would be of old age, as pointed out by the Councillor, and no one could say that no trouble would occur then, it was not true that 6-inch gun cruisers could not necessarily stand up against 8-inch gun cruisers. He added that some admirals even asserted that they could successfully sink one 8-inch gun cruiser with four destroyers.

Next, the same Councillor asked about the circumstances for the failure of our delegates to obtain the reduction of the tonnage of capital ships and also their guns, as had been instructed. The Navy Minister answered that Japan insisted on lowering the tonnage of capital ships, but that Britain and the United States, making parity between them their main object, had not agreed to our proposal. The same Councillor further stated that he was of the opinion that there was no way of making up the defects in national defense unless we carried our point, and he asked for the Navy Minister's view on this matter. In reply, the Navy Minister explained that by defects in national defense it was meant that a shortage in naval strength would arise if the tactical plan based on the already established national defense plan should be carried out as it stood; that the shortage was not impossible of being supplemented by something else; that even if we possessed 70%, this did not necessarily mean complete victory, but that it meant that a fifty-fifty battle could be fought; and that he was of the opinion that there was no error in the deficiency supplementation plan, because it had been unanimously approved by

the Supreme War Council. Thereupon, the Councillor asked if there was no defect in national defense, to which the Navy Minister replied in the negative.

Councillor YAMAKAWA raised a question to the following effect. Whereas the other day Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI answered that, in regard to the fixing of naval strength, there had been an agreement of opinion between the Acting Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff KATO, it is a fact that in the Diet he stated that he took into consideration /"SHINSHAKU"/ the opinion of the Naval General Staff. Now, as to the meaning of the word "SHINSHAKU," the "GENKAI," which is considered the most reliable dictionary in our country, defines "SHINSHAKU" as "to compare and then select." The "DAIHIPPOON KOKUGO DAIJITEN," also defines it as "to select after taking into consideration this and that." This word does not have by any means the same meaning as "DOI" /TN "agreement; consent approval"/. Now which is true?

Thereupon the Prime Minister asked the Committee Chairman for permission to explain, but the latter refused it, suggesting that the matter be taken up later as the question of Supreme Command was to be deferred for the time being. Accordingly, the same Councillor turned to the Navy Minister and asked whether or not the agreed opinion of our present highest naval authorities considered the naval strength stipulated by the treaty to be defective. The Navy Minister explained in detail that since the naval strength stipulated by the treaty involved excesses and shortages depending upon the categories, it had been decided to supplement as much as possible those portions having shortages by making accommodations among the various categories. The same Councillor requested him to answer simply "yes" or "no".

Thereupon the Navy Minister answered that although there was a shortage of naval strength numerically, no defect in national defense would be allowed to arise. The Councillor further asked whether although the Navy Minister said that no defect would be allowed to arise, it was not true that it was the second best, whereas the naval strength demanded by us was the best. The Navy Minister replied that although it was correct to consider it as the second best, it was possible to achieve the object of national defense with this naval strength.

Next, Councillor KANEKO said that national defense as conceived by the Prime Minister was quite different in meaning from the accepted definition of the term; that so-called "KOKUBO" means "national defense," which is defense against the invasion of a foreign army; and that economics, diplomacy, etc., as expounded by the Prime Minister was not national defense. He then asked the concept of national defense as spoken by the Navy Minister. The Prime Minister explained that what he had stated before was national defense in a broad sense, and that the accepted definition of national defense was the same as defined by the Councillor.

Councillor YAMAKAWA pointed out that, whereas the Navy Minister replied that our national defense under the treaty was the second best, it had been explained at the time of the departure of our delegate that this demand was the

minimum limit of national defense; and that if the second best would do, it was a lie to have called it the minimum limit. Then he asked if the highest naval authorities considered it possible to almost complete national defense by supplementation of naval strength. Replying in the affirmative, the Navy Minister said that it was possible to remove almost all defects although perfection might not be attainable. Continuing, the Councillor said that there were many factors which decide the issue of battle, but considering other factors to be the same for the time being, we should make the naval strength necessary to make possible a fifty-fifty battle as our standard and make it the minimum limit of the national defense plan; that the Government's instruction to the delegates was based on this standard. Accordingly, he argued whether a concession from this instruction would not make a fifty-fifty battle impossible. The Minister answered that there was a chance of carrying on a fight at almost fifty-fifty basis.

Thereupon, the Councillor asked in return whether it was not true that a fifty-fifty fight was impossible because of this "almost" /"HOBO"/. The Navy Minister said that the Councillor was perfectly right in this opinion, but that, of course, he considered himself capable of assuming the responsibility for it. Nevertheless, the Councillor declared that from a comparison between the plan to be drawn up within the scope permitted by this treaty and the original plan, he could not but consider the former as the best and the latter as the second best.

Lastly the Prime Minister explained that the statement that the naval strength stipulated by the treaty was insufficient meant that the naval strength was insufficient for maintaining and carrying out the operational plans based on the established national defense policy, but that this was naturally different from the defects in internal defense.

Chairman TIO announced that the meeting would be closed today, although there were further questions to be asked.

(The meeting was closed at 3:50 P.M.)

The Ninth Meeting of the Investigation Committee
regarding the Ratification of the
London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Held at the Offices of the Privy Council
on 10 September (Wednesday), SHOWA 5, /1930/

Those present:

President KURATOMI
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KANEKO	Councillor ARAI
Councillor KUBOTA	Councillor KAWAI
Councillor YAMAKAWA	Councillor MIZUMACHI
Councillor KURODA	

Absent: Councillor DEN

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI
Navy Minister TAKARABE
Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI
Secretary HORIE
Secretary MUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:00 P.M.)

Chairman ITO called the meeting to order.

Councillor KANEKO, after saying that it was his belief that the delegates, at the time of signing this treaty, had already investigated how much the burden on our people would be reduced by the treaty, asked the amount of this reduced burden. The Navy Minister, saying that he would give his mental calculation at that time, mentioned the rough amount of expenditures in case the treaty was successfully concluded and also in case it failed to materialize. The Councillor further requested the investigation of the maintenance expenditures required for auxiliary aircraft under the treaty. Councillor ARAI, too, inquired about the amounts of expenditures in case the treaty is concluded, and in case it failed to materialize.

Supplementing the reply of the Navy Minister, the Prime Minister explained the difficulty of calculating the figures and said that the reduction in amount would be almost nil.

Next Councillor MIZUMACHI said that he appreciated the circumstances which made the calculation of maintenance costs difficult, but he asked to know the source of revenue for the supplementary expenditures. The Prime Minister answered that the sum of ¥580,000,000 appropriated as a continuing expenditure from Showa 6 /1931/ to Showa 11 /1936/ would be its source. Thereupon the Councillors questioned how this amount would be distributed. The Prime Minister replied that both the supplementary expenditures and the amount of tax reduction would not be decided until after the matter had been discussed by the General Staffs and Ministries and also after consultation with the Finance Minister and the Foreign Minister.

Councillor YAMAMOTO, citing figures, discussed the expenditures for national defense and declared that if we exercised our rights under the treaty only ¥60,000,000 would be left, which, if divided into five years, would give ¥10,000,000 per year. He asked whether airplanes and other facilities could be provided and the security of national defense ensured with such a small amount. He further asked whether it was not true that if this amount were expended, the reduction of the burden on the people would become impossible. The Prime Minister replied that if we built substitute warcraft to the full extent of our right, the amount remaining would be ¥170,000,000, but that it was still an undecided issue whether we would avail ourselves to the full extent of the right to build substitute warcraft.

Next, Councillor ARAI asked whether the main points of the budget had not yet been decided even after the lapse of five months since the signing of the treaty. The Navy Minister replied that they had not yet been decided. The Councillor said that there was no way but to defer the examination of the bill under consideration until the time of the compilation of the budget, inasmuch as it was impossible to approve or disapprove it before seeing the supplementation plan. He requested that, if postponement was impossible, steps be taken to show at least the outline of the plan. Councillor MIZUMACHI also made the same request. The Navy Minister explained that he had been of the opinion that no plan for the construction of auxiliary warships need be submitted, because no such request had been made by the Privy Council on the occasion of the submission by the Navy Minister of the Washington Naval Treaty for imperial ratification on the ground that, although the ratio of 60% for capital ships would cause a defect in our national defense, there would be no hitch inasmuch as no restrictions had been placed on auxiliary warcraft.

Councillor KANEKO said that, according to the report of the United States Senate, that the United States fears most is submarines, and therefore the more the number of Japanese submarines was reduced, the more powerful the United States would become. Stating that as long as Japan possessed submarines, there was nothing to be afraid of from the United States, that world peace and international faith were merely outward courtesies, and that peace was untenable without repletion of military strength, he discussed the indispensability of submarines.

The Prime Minister stated that the arguments on the treaty null on the points, namely, the fear that we would be bound in the future by the ratio of 60% against the United States and the reduction of our submarine force, but that it was the agreed opinion of both the Navy Minister and the Chief of Naval General Staff that through the perfection of armaments other than those restricted there would be no insecurity in national defense. He then expressed the hope that the Councillors trust the Government and proceed with the deliberations.

Councillor ARAI again requested that the supplementation plan and the rough amount of tax reduction be shown, but the Navy Minister explained the reasons why this could not be done. Councillor KANEKO pointed out that, since a national defense plan was a matter under the direct supervision of the Chief of Naval General Staff and transmitted to the Navy Minister after it had received Imperial sanction, he could not understand the reason given to the effect that we might rest assured because the Cabinet assumed responsibility for it.

With the conclusion of the foregoing, Chairman ITO announced the closing of the meeting.

(The meeting was closed at 4:00 P.M.)

The Tenth Meeting of the Investigation Committee
regarding the Ratification of the
London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Held at the Offices of the Privy Council
on 12 September (Friday), SHOWA 5, /1930/

Those present:

President KURATOMI
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KANEKO	Councillor DEN
Councillor KUBOTA	Councillor ARAI
Councillor YAMAKATA	Councillor KAWAI
Councillor KURODA	Councillor MIZUMACHI

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI
Navy Minister TAKARABE
Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI
Secretary HORIE
Secretary MUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:00 P.M.)

Chairman ITO called the meeting to order. Interrogations were continued.

Councillor KAWAI argued that the fact that the former Chief of Naval General Staff had drawn up the plan for the supplementation of naval strength did not necessarily prove that he did not disapprove the naval strength of the bill under consideration. He then asked whether it was really possible to avoid insecurity of national defense by supplementation of armaments. The Navy Minister, asserting that there was no difference at all between the direct report to the Throne made by Chief of Naval General Staff KATO on 2 April and the purport of the Supreme War Council's reply to the Throne, and further that there was also no contradiction between his /TN. KATO's/ statement and this reply, he read the statement in question. Then he further stated that, according to his own understanding regarding the contents of the Supreme War

Council's reply to the Throne, defects would arise if the established national defense plan were to be maintained and operations based thereon were to be carried out with the naval strength agreed in this treaty; that, therefore, besides always maintaining, of course, the naval strength agreed upon, it was necessary to strive to replenish the air force, improve the warcraft belonging to categories not subject to the restrictions, replenish the substance of other naval armaments in general, and improve tactics, once the treaty was considered. If these counter-measures were carried out, he said that he considered there would be almost no hitch in national defense under present conditions.

The same Councillor further declared that the term "zensho" /TN "to take proper steps"/ of Chief of the Naval General Staff KATO could be interpreted in many ways and could not always be taken to mean only that the military strength was not disapproved, and asked why, if the new Chief of the Naval General Staff had already drawn up a replacement plan, it could not be presented. The Prime Minister explained that although the military strength provided for in this agreement would cause some defects in the execution of the established operations plan, as this was a short-term treaty, he believed that proper replacement would enable us to clear away almost all sense of insecurity regarding national defense. He continued that as there was a way of replenishing our strength and because the treaty was of short duration, the treaty had been signed. The Navy Minister answered that it was difficult to produce the replacement plan of the Military immediately that day.

Subsequently, Councillor YAMAKATA said that the other day the Navy Minister had stated that he could not reply to Councillor KAWAI's inquiry as it involved the honor of General KATO, yet now he (the Navy Minister) said that General KATO had never changed his principles. If that was the case, in what way was the honor of General KATO involved? The Navy Minister replied that he had simply said that he could not talk about his /TN General KATO's/ report to the Throne on 10 June for the sake of the General's honor. The same Councillor asked if he might take this to mean that the Navy Minister would not mention the ungentlemanly actions /TN. taken by the General/ aside from matters concerning military strength. The Navy Minister replied that it concerned His Imperial Majesty and the General's own movements; it was not concerned directly with military strength. The same Councillor argued that a gentleman should make his movements most clear and subsequently asked whether or not it was true that at the time of the interview of Plenipotentiaries WAKATSUKI and Stinson in London, Mr. Stinson became extremely angry at Mr. WAKATSUKI's assertion and tore up the document given to him by Mr. WAKATSUKI before the latter's face and threw it away. The Navy Minister acknowledged the fact and gave a detailed account of it.

Citing the Parkes case in which Parkes committed an outrage in the Japanese Foreign Ministry on about the first year of Meiji /about 1868/, the said Councillor discussed the proprieties of true gentlemen, and said it was a superstition to think that the United States was a country of justice.

He asked if there were not persons in the Foreign Ministry holding such a superstition. Furthermore, the Councillor said, there were people in this world who misunderstood the Japanese nation as being extremely warlike, but Japan had maintained her peace for two hundred and thirty years from the time of the AMAKUSA Rebellion of three hundred and thirty-three years ago until the HALLIGURI GONON Battle, after which only six wars had been waged, namely, the Conquest of CHOSHU, the HAKODATE Fighting, the Southwestern Rebellion, and the wars with foreign nations, namely, the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War and the German-Japanese War. On the other hand, the United States during the one hundred and fifty-five years since her independence had fought as many as six times, namely, the Independence War, the British-American War, the Mexican War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War and the German-American War. Therefore she had fought more than twice as many times as Japan. They speak of humanity and justice, but they never practice them. In 1926 the United States claimed the Sino-Japanese Treaty consisting of 21 articles to be null and void and attempted to purchase the South Manchurian Railway. The capital was to be borrowed from the United States with the railway as security. As a consequence, the South Manchuria Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway would have come under the control of the United States, and Japan would finally have been compelled to withdraw from Manchuria and Mongolia. People were apt to believe that the United States was a country of humanity, but she was far from being so.

According to the minutes of the U. S. Senate concerning the ratification of the London Treaty, Admiral Pratt stated that within the century the United States would fight for the sake of China. A century is a figure of speech in English, meaning "in the not too distant future." These were the words of a prominent high official in the United States Government. Then who can guarantee that there will be no war between Japan and the United States? The only way to prevent such a war would be to complete Japan's armaments. Although Japan could still bear the deficiency in her armaments, it was greatly to be feared that this deficiency would cause a gap, from which a Japanese-American war might arise, and the Councillor asked if it were not possible to build up Japan's naval armaments a little more.

The Foreign Minister stated that there were in the Foreign Office no superstitious persons such as previously mentioned, and after reading the notes of the speech made by Plenipotentiary WAKATSUKI in Seattle, expressed his approval of the principle of the speech. Then explaining the matter of the 21 articles of the Sino-Japanese Treaty, he said that after all the United States had acknowledged her own participation in the said treaty only because she had recognized the validity of the treaty. The Minister also declared that he believed the United States would never fight for the sake of China though Admiral Pratt might have said so, and said that in order to prevent a war with the United States, it was more important to increase the national power rather than armaments.

To this the same Councillor argued that neither did he think that the state of the national power did not matter. However, he did not think that the

peoples' power would be positively fostered by the conclusion of the treaty and that it would be impossible to lessen their burden should the treaty remain unmaterialized. On the contrary, would not more money be saved if the treaty were abrogated?

According to the stenographic records of the Foreign Relations Committee of the U. S. Senate, it was their unanimous opinion that the United States should be active in the Western Pacific Ocean and that only Japan could prevent her from her activity. The Western Pacific, the Councillor continued, meant the Republic of China and it virtually meant that the Japanese Navy should be demolished. Then, saying that although he could not obtain any satisfactory answers, he would conclude his questions, he closed his speech.

Subsequently the Prime Minister stood up and contended that though Councillor YAMAKAWA had said that the military strength provided in the treaty and its replenishment did not make national defense secure, there probably is no country that has a complete armament. Japan's military experts have affirmed that a fair fight was possible with this strength. Should the conference end in a rupture because of Japan's attitude, Japan would have to be prepared for a ship-building race which would have no other alternative than an increase of taxes, and it seems impossible for Japan's national power to last thus. Moreover, the rupture of the conference might cause a war.

Then Councillor YAMAKAWA said that, according to that reply, Japan would have to yield to the United States in fear of a ship-building race. However, in 1936 her ratio as against that of the United States would be 60%, and later it would fall to 50% and thus Japan would have to submit without fighting; and saying that he thought there was no other way but to come to a decision at this time he asked what the others thought of the matter.

Councillor KUBOTA expressed opinion that for national defense, wealth and diplomacy were necessary in addition to military power, and although knowledge and spirit were most essential, yet there was no other way to settle international disputes but to resort to arms in the end. Japan's importance today in the world lay in her military power alone. The London Conference was where Britain and the United States gave expression to their avarice under the fine names of universal peace and the lightening of burdens, but they were only afraid of Japan's military power. Such being the situation, he said, he was most concerned over the recent question of the Supreme Command and thought it was essential that the Navy Minister and the Navy Chief of Staff come to an agreement in deciding the military strength. Therefore, upon hearing that the Minister concerned had replied in his recent instructions that the two had come to an agreement he was greatly relieved.

Next, Councillor KANEKO declared that he had become more anxious after hearing the Foreign Minister's reply. As far as he knew the United States was generally opposed to Japan. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War, the United States had said that it was proper that Korea be annexed to Japan and Manchuria be developed by Japan with the South Manchuria Railway as the foundation.

However, as soon as Taft became President, her policy suddenly changed and she attempted to establish the AIGUN Railway, but in vain as she met Japan's opposition. Since then she has been trying to make Manchuria a market for American products. Thus some Americans were shouting that a war between Japan and the United States was inevitable in the near future, that docks should be built in Seattle and other places on the Pacific Coast, and preparations should be made. Also, a prosecutor, in connection with the oil graft case, had read a telegram in court that war would break out soon between Japan and the United States; and when the Japanese people were suffering from the earthquake disaster in the Kanto District in TAISHO 12 /1923/ the American Senate and House of Representatives passed the Immigration Law rejecting the Orientals. Such is the history of the United States. Yet the Foreign Minister said a while ago that there would be a time when the people of the United States would awaken. That, the Councillor said, he could not understand.

Japanese-American relations would be at their most dangerous point about 1937. The United States would most certainly purchase the South Manchuria Railway in cooperation with China and would attempt to drive Japanese influence out of Manchuria and Mongolia. Such being the case, it was extremely important to supplement the lack of military strength caused by the London Treaty. Justice, he said, was only superficial courtesy between nations, and the last resort was military power alone. That Japan could abolish extra-territoriality was due entirely to the Sino-Japanese War. On the other hand, the Netherlands which had once been known as the world's wealthiest country had fallen today to the position of a third-rate country because of the limitation of her armaments. That a small country like Japan could advance into the world as one of the Five Great Powers was due entirely to the military men. The Treaty of Portsmouth was also a reward of Japan's military's victory.

In Meiji 22 /1889/ when he /TN Councillor KANEKO/ had gone to Europe with the newly established constitution and asked constitutional scholars of the different countries for their criticisms, Articles 11 and 12 of the Constitution drew their attention most. They highly praised these provisions saying that such a constitution was unequaled in the world, that it was only in Japan that the Emperor himself exercised supreme military authority, that this was entirely the fruit of the special characteristics of Japanese history which the various European countries wished to obtain but could not, and that with such articles, military command could be firmly secured. National defense was the guarantee for national life, the Councillor asserted, and its deficiency should be most feared.

As the Japanese military system was characteristic of Japan, being based on the Japanese fighting spirit, soul, and national structure, it should be perfected to the last. On the basis of the speeches made in the United States Senate there could be no doubt that the London Treaty was a preparation for pressure against Japan after 1936.

Committee Chairman ITO announced the closing of the meeting.

(The meeting was closed at 4:00 P.M.)

The Eleventh Meeting of the Investigation Committee
regarding the Ratification of the
London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Held at the Offices of the Privy Council
on 15 September (Monday), SHOWA 5 /1930/

Those present:

President KURATOMI
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KANEKO
Councillor KUBOTA
Councillor YAMAKATA

Councillor KURODA
Councillor ARAI
Councillor KAWAI
Councillor MIZUMACHI

Absent: Councillor DEN

Ministers of State:

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI
Navy Minister TAKARABE
Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI
Secretary HORIE
Secretary MUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:00 P.M.)

Committee Chairman ITO called the meeting to order.

Councillor KURODA asked whether the rumor was true that the Government had sent a document to the Naval General Staff. The Prime Minister at the time the instructions were sent replied that he was requested by the Navy by letter, in case the treaty were passed in the original form, to fully consider each and every item for the sake of technical improvements and completeness of content of the national defense plan, and he had answered that he would consider them thoroughly after it had passed the Cabinet. Again, the same Councillor stated that though the authorities had often explained that the determination of military strength was the responsibility of the Government, he wondered what this meant, because it could not be decided without

the agreement of the Navy Chief of Staff. The Navy Minister replied that he thought it necessary to get the agreement of the Navy Chief of Staff. The same Councillor said that according to the reply made by the Government, the opinions of both the parties are said to have agreed, but, he asked, did they agree in practice? The Navy Minister replied that the practical matters were now under negotiation.

Next, Councillor APAI and the Navy Minister discussed the financial aspects of the conclusion or non-conclusion of the treaty, particularly the amount of supplementary expenditures and the reduction of taxes in case the treaty were concluded. With the figures in hand, the discussion grew. The Councillor requested roughly estimated figures on these two points, saying it was necessary to know the approximate figures in order to comment on the treaty. To this, the Navy Minister answered that the figures for supplementary expenditures were not calculated as yet, and it was impossible to announce them until the budget-making period. Councillor KURODA also requested the estimates be presented and the Navy Minister made almost the same reply. Next, Councillor KANEKO explained that, regarding the military strength for national defense, correspondence had been exchanged in March, the 29th year of Meiji /1896/, between the Prime Minister ITO and the Ministers of the Army and the Navy. Up to that time a direct appeal to the Throne had never been discussed with the Cabinet, and sudden orders concerning military strength for national defense were customarily given to the Cabinet; but after the above correspondence had been exchanged, it became customary to first consult the Cabinet on matters dealing with expenses.

Navy Chief of Staff TOGO and Army Chief of Staff OKU once made a direct appeal to the Throne concerning Army and Navy expansion and when the Imperial assent was granted to the SAIONJI Cabinet, a meeting of Marshals and Admirals was held concerning financial aspects and it was decided that the plan would be carried out gradually, but with regard to national defense requirements the decisions would always be made by the Navy General Staff and the Army General Staff.

Then the Councillor asked if this draft was the gist of the supplementary plan agreed upon by the Military Authorities. The Prime Minister replied that as he had explained many times before, the plan for supplementary military strength could not be established without regard to finances. To the inquiry of the same Councillor about the budget surplus which would result from the London Conference and the estimated amount of military power desired by the specialists, the Navy Minister replied that he was sorry he could not answer at the moment, as he had stated many times before.

Next, there were several questions and answers between the Councillor and the Navy Minister in regard to supplementing by airplanes, the lack of submarines, and the Councillor pointed out that according to the treaty, Japan was to wait with folded arms until the United States had built fifteen heavy cruisers, and to the United States this was not the reduction of armaments, but on the contrary, an expansion; and he asked if this matter was not discussed in the London Conference. The Navy Minister answered that the number

of United States heavy cruisers already built was two, but that she had more than ten if we included those under construction, and the total number would reach twenty-three if we included those provided for in the budget; and although our delegate had endeavored at first to limit the number to fifteen, it was in vain, and it was finally decided at eighteen; hence, we could call it an expansion of armaments for the United States if considered from the point of view of her present strength. Thereupon, the same Councillor, pointing out the fact that the United States had expanded her armaments by the London Conference, explained that she would be able to build up a well-balanced fleet for the first time through the treaty.

Councillor APAI asked if he could hear about the replacement plan agreed upon by both the Navy Minister and the Navy Chief of Staff, and if any special obstacles might occur, if the investigation were to be postponed until the budget had been made. The Prime Minister replied that it could not be delayed until the completion of the budget because if the plan did not receive Imperial assent the political situation would probably become unsettled, causing depression in economic circles. And he expressed his anxiety because so much gold had been flowing out during the latter half of that year.

Next, Committee Chairman ITO took the floor and stated that since September 18, eleven committee meetings have been held in the course of which many problems have been discussed and investigated. But as to the decision on military strength, the question has been raised whether it has been agreed to by the Military Authorities or not, to which the Prime Minister has declared repeatedly that he regards it as having been agreed to by the Military Authorities. As there were some, however, who still doubted the fact, they requested the Government to summon Mr. MATO, but the Government did not respond, and, therefore, it has become impossible for this body by its own powers to directly investigate the facts. But, as the Navy Minister has explained that an Imperial decision was given to the effect that the agreement of the Military Authorities is necessary in dealing with matters of Military strength, and the Cabinet has received the information already, the problem of the Supreme Command must be said to have ceased to exist.

No answer as to the telegram of the Navy Chief of Staff has been received, and such being the case, you will kindly understand that there is no further necessity to request the Government to tender it. With regard to the replacement and financial plans, which are essential for investigating this treaty, the Government requests us, as it were, to sign blindly without their being submitted to us at all; but we cannot place too much faith in the Government, considering the duty of our Council. At the previous meeting, however, the Navy Minister stated the contents of the Supreme War Council's reply to the Throne in connection with the present treaty. According to that statement, it is certain that there were some items in the said reply concerning the replacement of naval strength, and since this is the only key for deciding the approval or disapproval of the treaty, that is why we intended to request the Government to submit it at the opening of these committee hearings, but as we feared that it might cause delay in the proceedings, we had hoped

that the Government would present it voluntarily; but now, however, as the Navy Minister himself has described its contents, there can be no harm in presenting the reply to the Privy Council, so today we again request its presentation. I believe it to be the responsibility of the Cabinet to show us the reply, for the Prime Minister must have been informed about it privately as its contents are a state affair, and I think it is the Government's duty to show us the reply. I hope the Government will show its sincerity by proceeding to do so no matter how important it considers the matter to be. We will expect a reply by letter after due consideration.

To this, the Prime Minister replied that although it was stated that he altered his answer in this meeting from that which he had made in the Diet concerning the Supreme Command, he has not changed the principle but only was discreet in his choice of words. The extent of replacements /of naval strength/ and the reduction of taxes, cannot be published at this moment as they are now under investigation as well as negotiation. The Cabinet believes that they are not obliged to present such documents as materials for the purposes of investigation though they have no objection to producing them if they are completed; but they are not finished as yet.

He also stated that when this draft was presented for discussion, the President requested that the reply to the Throne be produced as it was a necessary material for investigation before the bill was submitted to the Committee. But he had answered that, as the Government did not keep it at hand, the document could not be produced, and therefore, the Committee should be convened again as soon as possible to hear the explanations of the Ministers concerned. Though the same request has been again received from the Chairman of the Committee, it is hoped that he will be satisfied with what the Navy Minister stated in detail the other day in regard to his opinion in approving the reply, and if he still insists on the request, there is only one way left, that of refusing it at once, the Prime Minister declared.

Committee Chairman ITO announced the meeting closed.

(The meeting was closed at 3:00 P.M.)

The Twelfth Meeting of the Investigation Committee
regarding the Ratification of the
London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Held at the Offices of the Privy Council
on 17 September (Wednesday), SHOWA 5, /1930/

Those present:

President KURATANI
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KANEKO
Councillor KUBOTA
Councillor YAMAKAWA
Councillor KURODA

Councillor DEN
Councillor ARAI
Councillor KATAI
Councillor MIZUMACHI

Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI
Secretary HORIE
Secretary MUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:00 P.M.)

Chairman ITO called the meeting to order and the Committee went into discussion.

By the request of Councillor KUBOTA, the Chairman of the Committee expressed his opinion as follows: As the Government unfortunately has not consented to present the investigation materials which were requested by the Committee, we have no choice, taking in consideration the limits of the authority of the Privy Council, but to close the investigation at this stage and make out a report. However, although we can say that the investigation of the treaty was made impossible because necessary materials were not produced, there is the consideration that such an attitude may cause the Privy Council to lose its dignity. Moreover, we are somewhat lacking in grounds for argument that the treaty should be abrogated. Therefore, I think it best that we state in a part of our report that if full cooperation be maintained with the Military, if the replacement plan for national defense be carried out, if the people's burdens be lightened and if thus a complete fulfillment of the objectives of the treaty can be expected; then, it will be proper for the Emperor to ratify the treaty on the grounds that the Government and the military authorities are responsible for the treaty.

To this, Councillors KURODA and ARAI expressed their opinions, and Councillor KAWAI asked if the investigation of this bill might not be postponed until after the completion of the national defense plan. Councillor DEN stated that it was regrettable that they could not be informed about the reply to the Throne and about the replacement and finance plans. He continued that, as he thought it proper, however, for the Privy Council to continue to the end to give appropriate replies to the Emperor, in this case there would be no other way but to act in accordance with the opinion of the Committee Chairman. He said that he believed that by doing so the duty of the Privy Council was fulfilled. Councillor YAMAKAWA stated that he wished to postpone the day's decision for further consideration, for according to the treaty our military strength would eventually be 60% of that of the United States, and in case of a war our country would be defeated. To this, the Chairman of the Committee expressed his opinion. The same Councillor further contended that the matter of whether or not the opinion of the Committee was adopted by the Council had nothing to do with the honor of the Committee and argued on two or three points with the Chairman. Subsequently, Councillor MIZUMACHI stated that although he regretted the lack of investigation material, as the financial world had not been in a normal condition recently, he agreed entirely with the Chairman's point of view.

Councillor KANEKO explained the purport of Articles XI and XII of the Constitution, and gave the details of the time the Constitution was made and stressed that military strength should be decided by a direct appeal to the Throne by the military and should not be decided in the Cabinet. Councillor KUBOTA then stated that although Councillor YAMAKAWA was right in his opinion, the situation would not allow it, and so unity of action should be practiced as much as possible, and he hoped that such measures as fighting for the decision by a majority would be avoided. Councillor YAMAKAWA agreed with Councillor KUBOTA.

After a number of discussions among the Committee members it was decided to pass the bill in accordance with the opinion of the Committee Chairman.

Chairman ITO announced that the Committee would convene once more in order to examine the draft of the report, and declared the meeting closed.

(The meeting was closed at 3:00 P.M.)

The Thirteenth Meeting of the Investigation Committee
regarding the Ratification of the
London Naval Treaty of 1930.

Held at the Offices of the Privy Council
on 26 September (Friday), SHOWA 5 /1930/

Those present:

President KURATONI
Vice President HIRANUMA

Chairman of the Investigation Committee, Councillor ITO

Members of the Investigation Committee:

Councillor KANEKO
Councillor KUBOTA
Councillor YAMAKAWA
Councillor KURODA

Councillor DEN
Councillor ARAI
Councillor KAWAI
Councillor MIZUMACHI

Chief Secretary FUTAKASHI
Secretary HORIE
Secretary MUTO

(The meeting was opened at 1:00 P.M.)

Chairman ITO called the meeting to order and expressed his desire to omit clause by clause consideration of the treaty as a preliminary investigation had already been made. The Committee then began to deliberate on the draft of the investigation report.

Reading of the draft of the investigation report. (Secretary HORIE read it several times.)

During this time questions and suggestions were made by the various members of the Committee. Finally the draft of the report was decided upon.

Chairman ITO announced the closing of the meeting.

(The meeting was closed at 2:00 P.M.)

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 1124

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, T. SUZUKI hereby certify
that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the
following capacity: Secretary of Privy Council

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached
consisting of 240 pages, dated , 1930, and described as follows:

Book entitled "Minutes of the Committee Meetings for the Years 1920,
Secretariat of the Privy Council."

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official
document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official
archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying
also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation
of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Privy Council

Signed at Tokyo on this

1 day of Oct., 1946.

T. SUZUKI
Signature of Official

Witness: J. A. CURTIS, 2d Lt.

SEAL
Secretary of Privy Council
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, JOHN A. CURTIS, hereby certify that I

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 1124

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, T. SUZUKI hereby certify
that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the
following capacity: Secretary of Privy Council

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached
consisting of 240 pages, dated , 1930, and described as follows:

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also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation
of the regular location of the document in the archives or files):

Privy Council

Signed at Tokyo on this

1 day of Oct., 1946.

T. SUZUKI
Signature of Official

Witness: J. A. CURTIS, 2d Lt.

SEAL
Secretary of Privy Council
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, JOHN A. CURTIS, hereby certify that I am
associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the
above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my
official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

1 day of Oct., 1946

J. A. CURTIS, 2d Lt.
NAME

Investigator
Official Capacity

Doc. 1124-A

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昭和五年

委員會錄

No. 1 Ex 910-A

樞密院秘書課

Doc. 1124-A

No. 2

按

千九百三十年「ロンドン」海軍條約批准、件第一回審査委員會
昭和五年八月十八日(月曜日)本院事務所ニ於テ開會

出席者

倉官 議長

平沼 副議長

審査委員長

伊東 顧問官

審査委員

金子 顧問官

久保田 顧問官

山川 顧問官

黒田 顧問官

田 顧問官

荒井 顧問官

河合 顧問官

水町 顧問官

二上 書記官長

堀江 書記官

武藤 書記官

(午後一時五分開會)

伊東委員長開會ヲ宣ニ本案ハ、主運、消長ニ関スル重要案件
ニ付、慎重に審議ヲ盡ササルヘカラサルニ由リ、先ツ審査、方針
及順序ヲ決定シ、萬一遺憾ナキヲ期シ、之ヲ旨ニ告ケ、偵問事項ヲ大
体六項ニ大別シ、各項ニ付主査員ヲ定メ、各自ニ於テ十分研究ヲ爲

1124

Doc.

No. 3

シタル上時日ヲ定メテ当局、説明ヲ聴取シ且質問ヲ爲スコト及本
會ニ於ケル議事、外部ニ漏洩セサルヤウ注意セムコトヲ望ミ連日本案
、審査ニ努力シタルニ上書記官長、勞ヲ謝ス

次ニ上書記官長ヨリ質問事項ニ付説明アリ、河合顧問官ヨリ軍
事參議院、上奏文、提示ニ付訊ストコロアリ伊東委員長之ニ
答フ

金子顧問官ヨリ統帥權問題ニ関スル質問ニ付述フルトコロアリ、委員
長亦之ニ関シテ所見ヲ述フ

倉富議長ヨリ曩ニ内閣總理大臣ニ付テ奉答文、提示方ヲ交渉
シタルニ審査上、必要資料トシテ提示セムコトヲ勸告スル意味ヲ以テ
シタルモ、ナリト前提シ其ノ顛末ヲ詳述ス

次ニ金子顧問官ヨリ夏休ヲ廢シテ早ク審議シ吳シト政府ヨリ交
渉アリシヤ否ニ付質問アリ、倉富議長ヨリ御諮詢書受理以來内閣
トノ交渉、次第殊ニ審議ヲ急クヤ否ニ関スル内閣ノ答辯ニ付陳述
アリ

金子顧問官ヨリ國際信義ヲ重シ本條約、批准ヲ急クヘシト爲メ
俗説ヲ斥ケ米國カ急ニ批准シタル國內ノ事情ヲ説明ス

次ニ委員長ヨリ本案審査、順序ニ付スル各員ノ意見ヲ向ヒ、河合
黒田兩顧問官ヨリ發言アリ、同委員長ハ更ニ從來國務大臣カ委
員會ニ不用ナル説明員ヲ多勢隨行スルハ有害無益ニ付特ニ必要
ナラサル限リ本件、審議ニ付テハ總理大臣及外務、海軍、兩大臣、ミ
、出席ヲホムコト、爲シ度旨ヲ諮リ、金子、久保田顧問官、賛成
アリ之ニ決ス

伊東委員長次回開會、時日ヲ告ケテ閉會ヲ宣ス

(午後二時四十分閉會)

No. 4

Doc 1124

千九百三十年「ロンド」海軍條約御批准、件第二回審
査委員會

昭和五年八月二十二日(土曜日)本院事務所ニ於開會
出席者

倉富 議長
平沼 副議長

審査委員長

伊東 顧問官

審査委員

金子 顧問官

久保田 顧問官

山川 顧問官

黒田 顧問官

田 顧問官

荒井 顧問官

河合 顧問官

水町 顧問官

國務大臣

濱口内閣總理大臣

財部海軍大臣

幣原外務大臣

二上書記官長

堀江書記官

武藤書記官

Doc 1124.

(午後一時五十分開會)

伊東委員長開會ヲ宣シ本安ホニ對スル當局、説明求
内閣總理大臣ヨリ千九百三十年ロントノ海軍條約ニ關シ
海軍軍備制限會議ノ沿革、ロントノ會議ノ目的、會議
ノ經過及條約ノ梗概ヲ説明シ且條約ノ效果ハ之ヲ昭和
六年ヨリ漸次實現シタント考フル日ヲ演述ス外務
大臣更ニ首相ノ説明ヲ補充シテ續々演述スルトコヨリ
又海軍大臣、其ノ専門的立場ヨリ會議ニ對スル我對策
ノ要項及條約ノ我兵力量ニ關スル規定ヲ説明シ其ノ
内容ニ付六元ヨリ不満足ナルモ此ノ際ハ彼我軍備ノ大
體、輪廓ヲ定ムルコトヲ必要ト考ヘ調印シタル日ヲ述
右終リ委員長ハ大臣ノ退席ヲ求ム

(各大臣退席)

其ヨリ委員間ノ協議ニ入リ兵力量ノ問題ニ付
テハ海軍大臣ヲ通ニテ所加藤軍令部長ノ出席ヲ
求メタリトノ意見ノ陳述アリ質問ノ事實ノ質問ヲ
先トスルコトニ決ス

伊東委員長開會ヲ宣ス

(午後二時五十分開會)

No. 5

千九百三十年、ロントノ海軍條約御批准ノ件第三回審
査委員會

昭和五年八月二十六日(土曜日)本院事務所
ニ於テ開會

Dac 1124

No. 6

出席者

倉富 議長

平沼 副議長

審査委員長

伊東 顧問官

審査委員

金子 顧問官

久保田 顧問官

山川 顧問官

黒田 顧問官

田 顧問官

荒井 顧問官

河合 顧問官

水町 顧問官

國務大臣

濱口内閣總理大臣

財部海軍大臣

幣原 外務大臣

二上書記官長

堀江 書記官

武藤 書記官

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No. 7

(午後一時五分開會)

伊東委員長開會ヲ宣ス
金子顧問官ヨリ新聞ニ依リ國務大臣ニシテ本院
敵視スルカ如キ言辭ヲ垂スルモノアリ之ヲ全ク明治
大帝ノ聖旨ニ背反スルモノニシテ甚タ遺憾ナリトス
我々ノ黨モ内閣ノ政策遂行ヲ妨クル意ナク只至誠
奉答ノ忱ヲ竭サントスルモノナレバ我々ノ質問ニ對シテ
忌憚ナク御答辯アリムニトテ布ムニ日ヲ述ヘ且内閣
ノ本意モ御批准ヲ非常ニ急キ休暇ヲ賜リタル旨中
ニモ拘ニス審議セムコトヲ望ミタル事由ヲ聞キタリト告
之ニ對シ外務大臣ノ答辯アリ同顧問官ニ更ニ「アイ
ランド」ヲ批准セザル本條約ノ實施出來サルニアラスヤト訊
米國カ早速批准ヲ了スルハ内政上ノ便宜ニ出ルニ過キ
スト述ヘ更ニ日本全權カ米國ヨリノ招電ニ依リ米國ノ經
由ニテ渡英タル事情ヲ質シ外務大臣之ニ答フルトニ
ロアリ次テ同顧問官ヨリ財部全權ハ出發前貴衆
兩院議員其ノ他ヲ招キ所謂三大原則ノ説明ヲ爲シ對
米七割ヲ以テ最少限度ノ兵力量ト爲スト述ヘタル事案
アリヤ否ヤヲ質シ海軍大臣然リト答フ續イテ同顧問官
ハ若槻全權モ亦「サンフランシスコ」ニ於テ對米七割ヲ最
少限度ト爲ス日ヲ述ヘタリト聞クカ事實貴ナリヤト問
ヒ外務大臣答フル所アリタルモノニ満足セス若槻全
權ニ之ヲ訊サントテ要ム
更ニ同顧問官ハ七割問題ニ付「スチン」ニ出洲大
使乃若槻、財部兩全權トノ間ノ交渉事實及所謂
妥協案ハ松平「リード」ノ會見ニ依テ成立シタルヤ

Dac/124

No. 8

不^レヤヲ質^シ外務大臣ヨリ^レ復々答辯ス其ヨリ同顧問官
ハ左^ニ妥協案^ヲ成立スル迄安保大將ニ付^テハ何ニモ相談
セサリト云フ^ニ尊^ニヲ質^シ海軍大臣然^ラサル^ニ日ヲ^モ答^ヘ
タルカ同顧問官^ハ更ニ日英米^ノ妥協案^ヲ出来タル時安
保大將^ヲ潜水艦^ノ保有量^ノ同一ナルニ^モ現^ニ有量保
有^ノ必要^ヲ力説^シタルモ若槻全權^ハ今日^ニ及^ニテ^ハ駄目ナリト
謂^フヘリト云^フ事^ハ實^ニ有^ル無^ク問^フ外務大臣之^ニ答^フ
續^テ同顧問官^ハ若槻全權ヨリ^ニ妥協案^ヲ付^ケ可^ク訓令^ヲ
請^フタル際^ニ陸軍部^ハ全權^ハ山梨海軍大臣^ニ宛^テ妥協案^ヲ付
軍令部^ノ意見^ヲ内閣^ニ出^シタルヨリ^ト打電セリト聞^ク其^ノ全
文^ヲ示^サタル^ニ又米國上院^ニ於^{ケル}議事^ハ狀態^ヲ見^シ本
條約^ハ秘密^ノ文書^{ナル}カ如^ク果^シ然^ラハ之^ヲモ提示^サレ度
旨^ヲ述^フ之^ニ對^シ海軍大臣及外務大臣ヨリ^テ夫^レ答辯^スト
コナリ
更^ニ同顧問官ヨリ貴族院^ニ於^テ濱口首相^ノ憲法草案上
條及第十條^ノ意義^ヲ付^テ學者^ノ意見^ヲ収^メタル^ニ故
ニ^テ述^スト答^ヘタル事^ハ實^ニ有^ル無^ク質^シ内閣總理大臣ヨ
リ^テ是^レ中審議^ヲスル^ニ理由^ヲ説明^シ次^ニ憲法上^ノ解
釋^ハコト^ニ條約^ノ問題^ハ直接關係^ナク答辯^ハ之^ヲ差
控^スル^ニ適當^ト考^ヘタル^ニ爲^タ二日^ヲ答^フ
其ヨリ同顧問官^ハ帷幄上奏^ヲ移牒書^及兵力^ヲ問^フル
事^ハ有^ル處理^ニ關^{スル}上奏書^ノ正文^ヲ提示^ヲ求^ム
河合顧問官^ハ我全權^ハ本發前^ニ聲明^ニ拘^ラス三犬原
則^ヲ他^ヲ請^フ訓令^ニ付^テ及軍令部^ノ之^ニ賛成^ニタル^ニト
詢^フ不可解^{ナリ}ト論^シ海軍大臣^ニ對^シ海軍大臣事務
官^ノ設置^ニ對^シ感想^及軍事參議官會議^ニ於^テ

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將來海軍大臣事務官理ヲ置カサルコトヲ命令セタリトイフ
 事實、ニ其命令問フ之ニ對シ海軍大臣ヨリ本官ニ對米七割
 ヲ金二厘缺ケテモ條約ニ成立セシメラシムト考ヘカリニ由リ
 述(且其カ事項、處理ニ關スル上奏文ヲ提示セリ
 内閣總理大臣、金子顧問官、要請ニ係ル性體上奏ト
 内閣ト關係調査、明治初年ヨリ全部ニ亘ルヲ要スルヤ
 ト問アリ金子顧問官ヨリ明治四十三年以降内閣(移轉セ
 ラタルモノ、件名調々ニテ可ト答フ答フ
 次テ河合顧問官ヨリ帝國全權ニ對スル内訓、提示ヲ要
 求ス
 加終テ伊東委員長本日、之ニ開會スル旨、宣ス
 (午後四時五十分開會)

十九百三十年四月二日、海軍條約御批准、件第四回審査委員
 會報五年八月二十日(木曜日)本院事務所ニ於テ開會
 出席者

- | | |
|----|-----|
| 伊東 | 顧問官 |
| 金子 | 顧問官 |
| 山田 | 顧問官 |
| 田川 | 顧問官 |
| 荒井 | 顧問官 |
| 富澤 | 副議長 |
| 平 | 議長 |
| 伊東 | 委員長 |

No. 9

Dac 11/24

閣下 水河 合 顧問官
又 保田 顧問官
國務大臣
濱口 內閣總理大臣
幣原 外務大臣
二上 書記官長
武江 書記官
藤 書記官

(午後一時開會)

伊東 委員長 開會宣言

金子 顧問官より前内閣と現内閣と定延樞密院の
敵とスルヲ如キ態勢ニ其ノ不都合ノ一トナリト論難
ノ新閣政ニ依リ十二月八日日本公使會ニ於テ
民衆意見演説會ニ于永井外務次官カ國際正義
ノ増進國民負擔輕減ノ多ク解釋セシメタルコト
修治、扶植ヲ樞密院ガ妨害スルハ國民ノ敵トカ
故ニ大ニ敵ニナルカラズ。トイフ又ヨシタノイハズ
記事三三ノ顧問官、如左枯人、今日、國家ニ大敵
要ナリト語リテ述ヘシ事案、樞密院ニ於テ
對シ外務大臣永井演説及談話、必ラウ正確
報道スルハ、トイフ答フ答ニ於テ同顧問官、

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No. 11

永井次官ニ付、事實、取柄等十廿二トヲ要求シ同大臣
之ヲ受諾ス。
次ニテ同顧問官ヨリ日本、何故ニ大陸組ニ入り、
伊佛一トス通リニ十廿二トヤト問アリ。之ニ對シテ
外務大臣ヨリ答辯スル所アリ、更ニ同顧問官、外
務大臣、本條約ヲ寧ロ成功ナリト云フニ、米國上院
一議事筆記ヲ具シ、本條約目下大巡洋艦二隻ヲ
有スルニ過キサル米國カ十五隻ヲ有スルニ至ルニテ日
本ヲニテ拱手傍觀セシムルナリト論セルニアリ、
之ニテモ我カ外交ニ成功ナリヤト論難シ、米國ニ於
テ、兵力量、大統領之ヲ定メ日本ニ於テ、帷幄輔
弼ニヨリテ天皇自ラ定メ給フナリト云フニ、現
斯ノ如ク我カ國ニ不利ニシテ米國ニ有利ナル條
約ニ調印スルニ對シ、米國人ハ日本ニ對シ脱帽ス
ヘント嘲弄セリトテ米國上院、議事録ヲ引用シテ
本條約、寧ロ我カ國外交ニ大失敗ナレト云フ論ハ、
之ニ對シテ外務大臣ヨリ辯駁力ナル所アリ
同顧問官、更ニ轉ニテ米國、巡洋艦代換
規定ニ就キ質問シ、又我カ國、驅逐艦及潛水艦、
廢棄カ米國ニ比シテ著シク不利ナキヲ摘示シ、
ク、如キモ我カ國、本條約ニ同意セサルカヲサルヤ
ト詰リ且、ロニトシ會議ニ於ケル英米兩國、關係
ニ就キ精シキ説明ヲ求メ之ニ對シ、外務大臣ヨリ去
答辯アリ
伊東委員長ヨリ赤岡勝ヲシ、キシ合款ニ付

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質問アリ外務大臣及海軍大臣より之に答へ
 次々皇田顧問官より内閣府、関係に付希望を陳べ
 續々本條約の始、現内閣成立以來の諮詢等、件々内閣
 外交文書、誤謬、脱漏甚多、勘方なき、如き上、至尊
 之煩に奉り下内外、衆庶より之を過誤、陷るゝに慮るゝ以テ
 之を、原因を以テ、將來再とから、如き失態をなすことヲ望まざ
 具体の事例、挙げて注意を促す所アリ、外務大臣及總理大
 臣より之を粗漏ヲ説き、將來充分注意を要す、(コト曰ふ、答へ)
 金子顧問官、外務大臣、答辯中責を、寫眞、版、紙、
 時、嫁に、如き言を、甚多、不條理ナリ、難し、外務大臣ト、
 同、問、答、
 右終、軍、東、委員、長より、本、委員、會、閉、會、の、旨、傳へ、
 如き、呼、に、甚多、遺憾ナリ、授、授、本日、之、三、閉、會、を、
 宣ふ
 南田顧問官より、庫、監、業、組、員、二、重、安、員、付、員、同、り、海、軍、
 大臣、之、に、答へ

(午後三時三十分閉會)

10.12

大正十三年「口」ト、海軍條約御批准件案、國、憲、查、
委員、會

昭和五年九月一日(月曜日) 本、院、事務、所、於、閉、會

本、席、者

倉、富、議、長

平、沼、副、議、長

憲、查、委員、長

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伊東 顧問官
金子 顧問官

金子 顧問官

久保田 顧問官

山川 顧問官

黒田 顧問官

荒井 顧問官

水河 顧問官

合町 顧問官

顧問官

國務大臣

濱口 内閣總理大臣

財部 海軍大臣

幣原 外務大臣

二上 書記官長

佐江 書記官

武藤 書記官

No. 13

(午後一時開會)

伊東委員長開會、直に前回里田顧問官、質問、
スル答辭、漏レテ、條約正本中、誤記、如何ニ取扱ハル
ルヤト、質問、里田顧問官ヨリ、モ亦該頃同、主旨ニ付
述フニ所アリ、外務大臣ヨリ之ニ答、
河合顧問官ハ帝國全權ニ對シ、訓令、決定、タル手續
順序ヲ、海軍大臣ニ答、尚同顧問官、海相、

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No. 14

既定ノ慣行アルニ拘ハラス何、必要アリテ兵力ニ関スル
重要ノ事、上奏裁可ヲ請ヒタリヤヲ質シ海軍大臣ヨ
リ之ノ會議後、臨時議會ニ於テ問題トナリ軍部内
ニ於テ无程々、議論生シタリカニ爲ナリト云フ。次
ニ同顧問官ニ於テ海軍大臣事務管理
相、該慣行遵守セシサレシヤニ考フルカ如何。ト質問
ヲ受ケタルニ對シ海軍大臣ヨリ本官歸朝後責任
アル人ニ付聞キ直セリカニ當時事務管理、執リタ手
續ニ何等不都合ナシト、決論ニ達スルリト云フ。
何レ顧問官ハ更ニ軍令部次長以下多數部員、
移動ヲナシタル理由ヲ問ヒ海軍大臣之ニ答フ。次
ニ同顧問官ヨリ軍令部次長更迭、事情ニ付詳細
ニ説明ヲ求ムルニ對シ海軍大臣、新聞記事基
上、所質問ハ甚ク遺憾ナリト求メ加藤大將、同訓
時ニ令ケル行動ヲ自ラ遺憾ト、積極的ニ意見ヲ發
表セザルニ自責ノ念ニ堪ヘストレテ辭表ヲ出スル故
更迭、上奏ヲナシタルモノナリト辭ス。
同顧問官ハ又加藤大將、統帥權、独ニ對シ申
譯ナシトイフ辭ヲ以テ辭意ヲ上奏スルニ要ス
ト仰セラルルニ如ク解セラルカ也何ト質シ海軍大
臣ハ之ニ對シ辭職言上ト共ニ書類ヲ差上ケタル
事實ナレト云フニヨリ人事移動ヲナシタルモノニ
サレヨリ合フ同顧問官ハ更ニ古近司令將、
財政部全權ノ意ヲ承ケ山梨海軍次官ニ對シ決
裂ノ覺悟ニテ同訓ヲ打電シ同訓後軍
令部長ハ又財政部全權宛打電ヲ送リ

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ト直ラトシ、電文、提示ヲ求メ海軍大臣、口ニトシテ打
變ニタルカ當時事情ヲ述ヘ決ニテ同僚ヲ震仰リ、秋電ヲ發
シタルモノニ非サル者ヲ辯疎シ、部長ヨリ、電報、大意ヲ述フ
同顧問官ヨリ、財部全權、加藤厚令部長カ請訓案、
兵力量反對タルモノヲ承知タルニ合ヤ否實ニ對シ海軍
大臣、決裂ヲ睹ニテ迄ニ反對セザルヘトテ、口ニテ答ヘタル
ヨリ、同顧問官、全權、何故厚令部長、意思ヲ確メカリヤ
ト詰リタルカ同大臣、海軍大臣事務管理ニ東京ニ在リ、故ニ全權
タル財部ヨリ之ヲ確ニ、必要ナト信スルモノヨリ答ヘ四月二日發、
厚令部長、電報ヲ訓讀ス

此時伊東亦員長、海軍大臣、訓讀ニタル電報、提示ヲ
求メタルニ同大臣、頭屬、上返答ニトシテ答フ
荒井顧問官ヨリ、前同本員會ニ於テ海軍大臣、舉ゲタル日、
米大巡艦、噸數ニ付不審ヲ質シ、且同訓當時海軍大臣
事務管理ト厚令部長ト、兵力量ニ關スル意見、一致ニ
ヤ否又意見、一致ニ否トテ、口ニテ答ヘタルニ、付顧問官、之ニ
對シ海軍大臣及内閣總理大臣ヨリ仔細ニ答辯アリ、内閣
總理大臣、原則トシテ、口ニテ之ヲ重々控ルニテ同訓案ニ
對シ、兩者、意見、一致ニ否トシ、且之ヲ得見セタル日ヲ
答辯ス

次テ同顧問官ヨリ、同田軍事務會議官、何故アリ、厚令
部長ト同行セシヤ部長、答辯ニ曖昧、ト答ヘタル、何故ニ
對然、之ヲ確メカリヤト訊ネタルニ對シ、内閣總理大臣ヨリ、兩
氏ト會見、際同氏、代表的意見トシテ、事能ニテ得ル
海軍、專同的意見、後程山梨次官ヨリテ求ヘタルモノ
若シ、會議ニ於テ本案、通リ決定ハ最善、方法ヲ研究

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スヘシト述(加藤氏、軍令部トシニ之ヲ作戦用兵ニ因
ル然(本条ニ決定スルニ最モ、始メ行フヘシト告ケ
リト答フ

金子顧問同官ヨリ天皇ヲ兵額ヲ定メルニ日本憲法、明
示スル所ナリト説ク條約ニ依ル兵力量、決定ニ付帷幄會議
議ヲ開カサリト理由ヲ問フ之ニ對シ總理大臣、フシトシ會議
後、處理例ニ從ヘリト答ヘ總テ大權、天皇ニ歸スル故ニ
輔弼機關カ大權ヲ侵奪スル、絶対ニ得ヘラスト考
ト述フ此ニ於テ同顧問官、憲法ニ於テ條制長、事情ヲ説
明シ我國ニ於テ、兵力量、決定、大權、最モ肝要トスル所ニ
内閣得テ裁定得ヘキモノニヤカニ次第ヲ論述ス之ニ對シ
總理大臣ヨリ兵力量、決定、形式トシ、閣議ニ依リ外ニ
本條約ニ依ル兵額、軍令部長同意得テ決スルモノ
旨ヲ答ヘテ所アリタカ、伊東房員長、軍令部長、意見
無視ニ付、世ニ説ニ喧論アリ直ニ取罷フヘシト及ニ果
シテ總理大臣、言、如ハ世間、導ト、甚ニ相違アリト
述(開會ヲ音ス

(午後四時十分閉會)

No. 16

十九百三十五年(二)ノ海軍條約御批准、件第
同審査委員會
昭和五年九月三日(水曜日)本院事務所ニ於テ
開會

出席者

倉田 議長
平沼 副議長

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No. 17

審査委員長

伊東 顧問 官

審査委員

金子 顧問 官

山久 顧問 官

荒思 顧問 官

水河 顧問 官

井田 顧問 官

町合 顧問 官

田 顧問 官

閣席

國務大臣

濱口 閣内閣總理 大臣

幣原 外務 大臣

武堀 二上 書記 官長

藤 書記 官

書記 官

(午後一時開會)

伊東委員長開會ヲ宣ス

金子、顧問官ヨリ公開、席上ニ

對シ、五五五ヲ加ヘタル永井外務政務次官ハ

二月、予定ヲ以テ近々支那へ旅行セトス

ト、又トタルカ夫般本官、彼其間、解決セル迄

Dac 1124

其責任はト答へル、ミト答へ同顧問官、更ニ軍部、不同意
ルニ拘ラス首相カ條約所長、兵力量ヲ以テ國防安全ナリト爲
ス理由如何及今次協定、兵力ヲ以テ我國兵備一部ナリト云フ
意味如何向ニ又軍令部長職權如何及同部長、同意セ
カリシキヲ以テ向且國防安全ナリト云得（サ理由ヲ領ス總理
大臣夫レ之ニ答フ

次テ同顧問官、更ニ同訓令軍令部長、於テ起草セラルル者
及我全權ヨリ、傳々本請訓令、且最後案ニテト具申セ
ルニ拘ラス之ヲ最後ト爲シテ理由如何領ス總理大臣ヨリ夫レ
之ニ答ヘ全權ヨリ之ニ以テ彼ヲ以テ讓步セシムル見込ナリト、通
知アリシカ爲ナリト述フ依テ同顧問官、更ニ海軍大臣事務
管理、三月二十七日軍令部長ト會見、條約部長ニ於テ飽迄
不同意ナシ、自今於テ裁決スル外ナリト之（リト聞カ如何
シテ此、如キコトヲ云得ルヤ又其ノ際軍部會議官會議、
同會ヲ全請シタルコトナキヤ向ニ總理大臣ヨリ其ノ性質分
ハ持テ云ヒタルニ過キ又軍部會議官會議、多集之ヲ
奏請スルコトナリト答ヘ同顧問官、更ニ追及シテ首相
ハ如何ニテ目ニ裁決、外ナリト謂ヒ得ルヤ理由ヲ聽キト述
スル總理大臣、進自今、ハ持テ云ヒタル、ミト前答辯、繰
返シテ此、於テ同顧問官、斯ノ如キハ持テ如何ニテ起ルヤ
ト詔リ且軍令部長カ同意シタリト、首相、認度ラ不當ナ
ト論述、總理大臣、之ニ對シテ續々當時、情況ヲ敘述シ
部長、同意アリタリト認タシ事情ヲ述ハタルカ同顧問官、
同部長、擇措ヲ敘述シ之ヲ以テ同意ナリタリト解ス、餘
ニ輕率ナラスヤ論、總理大臣、之ヲ不當ナリト主張セリ
其ヲ同顧問官、首相、議會ニ於テハ兵力量、決定權

No. 19

No. 1124

No. 20

政府ニテ述ハタルモ本院ニ於テ辯明、全
其ト田舎ニテ摘摘ス之ニ對シ總理大臣ハ決定
カ政府ニテハハス條約締結閣議
於テ決定スト謂ヘリ軍務意見ヲ對
西ニテ範圍ト程度トハ外輪ノトナシ合辯限
リニアラスト答フ安ニ於テ同顧問官ハ何故
ニ首相ハ軍部ハ意見ト一致ヲ受メル天ニ對シ
テ意見ハ一致ニテ説明セシヤト實總
理大臣ハ軍部ハ終局ニ於テ異議ナリト天
ト答フカ故ナリト辯明セリ
金子顧問官ヨリ帝國議會ニ於テ首相
軍部ハ意見ヲ尊重西ニテ謂ヘテ軍
部ハ同意ニテ謂ヘサレ理由ニ付然
總理大臣ヨリ同意ヲ得タリト述フカ受ナ
カリキト答ヘタルニ同顧問官ヨリ同意ヲ得
ヨリト云ハルカ故ニ問題起リ一時西酌ニテ
政府カ之ヲ定タリト謂ハサルカサレ理由甚
タリ可解ナリト論評ス總理大臣ハ之ニ對シ
答ヲ本部ハ軍令部ハ意見トサス（キニアス
ヲ議會ニ於ケル討論對テ要求トサス）キニアス
ト答ヘタルカ爲ナリト辯明セリ同顧問官
今ハ答辯ニ満足スルニアフサレ天ニ對シ
顧問官ハ之ニ打切ニ曰ク生々次テ所合
顧問官ヨリ軍令部長ハ意見ハ他ヨリ誤
（カフサレ天ニ對シ）首相ハ之ヲ辯明ニハ
恰モ政府諮詢機關ハ觀アレカ如何ト問
アリ總理大臣ハ答フ

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No. 21

荒井顧問官の重大なる令一應問フト前提ニテ首相、
兵力量ノ決定ニ軍令部長、同意ヲ要スト考フニヤト確
メタルニ對シ總理大臣ハ大臣ト部長トノ意見カ一致ニテ
居ルベキナリト考フニカ故ニ海軍大臣ヨリ申出ツニコトハ軍
令部長ト一致ニテ非ニモノトニテ取扱フ考ヘナリト答フ同
顧問官ハ然ラズ大臣ト部長トノ間ニ一致ナカリシトキハ如何
ト質ニタルニ總理大臣ハ一致セシムル所マテ協議セシメサ
ルベカラスト述フ依テ同顧問官ハ斯ル場合ニ於テハ總
理大臣ハ職責トシテ之ヲ一致セシメテ取扱フ必要ナ
キヤト述ベタル對シテ一致セサルモノハ首相ノ所ニ持テ來
ラサルベシト答ヘ首相ハ兵力ニ關スル事項ノ處理ニ關
シ海軍大臣ト軍令部長トノ意見一致アルベキモノト認
ムルニヤト確メタルニ對シテハ然リト答辯ス
伊東委員長ヨリ軍令部長ノ同意問題ニ付テハ首
相ノ答辯ハ本官ノ傳聞セル所ト大差アリテ了解ニ苦
ムモノトシテ海軍大臣事務管理ト部長トノ交渉經過
事實ヲ詳述シ且疑問ヲ氷解ニ審議ノ進捗ヲ圖
ル爲メ前軍令部長ノ出席ニ付首相及海軍大臣ニ於
テ盡力セシムルキニ付テ述フ黒田顧問官ヨリ之ニ對スル
賛意ヲ表示アリ委員長ハ次テ御相談ノ上明日返答
セラルモノ不可ナキニ付テ述ベタルトコロアリ總理大臣ヨ
リ篤ト熟考、上返答スベシト答ヘ且本官ハ帷幄上
奏ノ通知モ受ケタルカ結局ニ於テ私ノ言フ通異議ナカ
リシモノト解スル點ニ付テ部長ノ考トハ異ナリヤモ知ルベ
カラスト詳疏ス
伊東委員長ヨリ軍令部長ノ同意ヲ表シタルコトナリト

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No. 22

言へりし事なりし陳述アリ之ニ対し總理大臣、本官、前部長
 同意と謂ふに之を以て唯結局具議ナカリシモノと認メ
 タル旨ヲ述タリト辯解セリ
 伊東委員長閉會ヲ宣ス
 (午後四時三十分閉會)

大正十三年「口下」之條約御批准、件等七回審査本
 員會

昭和三年九月五日(金曜日)本院事務所ニ於テ開會
 出席者

倉富 議長
 平沼 副議長

審査委員長
 伊東 顧問官

審査委員
 金子 顧問官
 冬保田 顧問官
 山川 顧問官
 黒田 顧問官
 荒井 顧問官
 水河 顧問官
 合 顧問官
 所 顧問官

出席者
 田 顧問官

國語科

財政部 海軍大臣

武堀 二上書記官長
藤江 書記官長

No. 23

(午後一時五分開会)
伊東委員長開会ヲ宣シ本委員會、並軍令
部長、出席御座方、布均ニ對スル内閣總理
大臣、國會議員(拒絕)ヲ朗讀ス
金子顧問官ヨリ首相ノ議會ニ於テ、軍部、
同意ヲ得タルト答フ印シテ議會ニ於テ、
云フ取テ、問ニ對テ、答フ印シテ、
ト云ヘ、何故不可ナリヤト論、轉ニ、本條
第三十三條但書、由テ作成セシキ、事由ヲ
問フ之ニ對シテ海軍大臣ヨリ、之ニヨリ、
ノ認ルニ到ラザリシ我主張、之ヲ放棄セサ
ルコトヲ表スルコトヲ得ハカ故ニ、トニ、
船ニ、日本、次、會議ニ於ケル主張ニ對シ、
ヲ與フルモノト考テ、答フ又總理大臣ヨリ、
到ルニ依リ、大巡洋艦、對米、古、
到ルニ、端緒ヲ開ク、爲ス、
爲

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16.24

時ニ本項ヲ設ケテ次、海軍會議ニ於ケル各國ノ態度
ニ付本條約ノ規定ニヨリ何等ノ拘束ヲ受クルコトナキ
ヲ明ニシタルモノナリト答辯ス
同顧問官ハ獨立ノ國家カ條約ノ滿了後之ニ拘束
ニルコトナキハ國際法上ノ原則ニシテ斯ニ條規ヲ俟ツ
マテモ無キコトナリト述ヘ我全權カ之ヲモ成功ナリト
爲ス強辯モ亦甚シト論セリ之ニ對シ總理大臣
ヨリ釋明スル所アリシカ同顧問官ハ更ニ本規定、單
ニ氣安メノミ軍擴トナルヘキ主張、到底將來ニ於
テ許サルヘキニアフスト断スルヤ總理大臣ヨリ日本カ次回
ノ會議ニ於テモ尚所謂三大原則ニ基ク主張ヲ爲
スヤ否ヤハ不明ナルカ假ニ之ヲ主張ストスルモ必スモ
軍擴トハナラス蓋シ輕巡及驅逐艦ヲ若干減縮
シテ大巡及潜水艦ニ其レ丈増加スルモ總計ニ於テ
増加スルコトナケハナリト論セリ此ニ於テ同顧問官ハ
更ニ本條約ハ米國カ其ノ目的タル日本、大巡艦及
潜水艦ニ制限ヲ加フルコトニ成功シタルモノナレハ次回、
會議ニ於テ斯レ規定カ何等ノ用ニモナラサルヘキハ勿
論ナリト侃々所見ヲ演述シ海軍大臣ヨリ米國全權
ハ八吋巡洋艦ニ餘リ熱中シ過キタル傾キリ技術上ヨ
リ見レハ六吋艦必シモ八吋艦ヨリ劣勢ナラス潜水
艦ノ有利亦必シモ定説アルニアフスト辯論セリ
次キ河合顧問官ヨリ先般來、質問ノ結末ヲ附ケ
タシトテ發言シ、許可ヲ要メタルモ委員長ヨリ他日更
ニ查明ノ機會アルヘキニ付述ヘタルニ依リ同顧問
官ハ海軍大臣カ貴族院ニ於ケル答辯中ニ兵力カ

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萬事ヲ決スル時代、過去主として述べた通り不可解ナリト、何時ニモ
之ヲ決定スル能ハズ置置、立憲、憲法、殊ニ國家ノ利権ニ對シ
日米關係、米國其、但、第三國、關係、此時、即ち東洋平和
危機、大ニ以テ日本優勢、基礎、亦存セサル、カラスト論、之
ニ對シ、政府、所見、實、之ニ對シ、總理大臣、亦、本條約、條
件、力、量、對米、比率、千九百三十六年、迄、從、低下、ニ、事
宜、從、從、義、國、際、之、御、心、配、大、ナリ、然、レトモ、本
官、國、交、國、務、財、政、政、理、等、モ、亦、國、際、一、客、件、ト、言、フ、係
國、際、一、部、分、付、テ、自、ラ、不、滿、ト、モ、暫、ク、之、ヲ、平、權、ス、ル、コト
爲、リ、三、十、六、年、迄、不、利、ニ、比、率、二、百、五、十、八、カ、ラ、セ、レ、三、十
七、年、初、頭、リ、割、入、艦、ス、ル、コト、得、ル、政、條、約、反、セ、レ、米、國、
於、此、事、條、約、整、へ、置、キ、期、間、同、時、割、入、艦、看、守、セ、同、ニ、
七、割、ノ、維持、ス、ル、到、ル、ヘ、米、國、ノ、比、率、低、下、時、期、短、ク、
支、那、於、此、事、條、約、構、へ、ト、ス、ル、紀、元、重、慶、ト、ヘ、ト、考、ヘ、ト、
答、辯、ス、

no 25

河、合、顧問、官、次、會議、於、此、我、主、張、カ、通、シ、最、上、ト、モ
甚、ク、疑、ハ、ル、者、ト、通、ラ、カ、シ、事、實、於、本、條、約、永、久、拘、束、
ル、危、険、アリ、本、官、米、國、カ、ス、支、那、於、此、事、條、約、起、ス、ヘ、ト、謂、ハ
カ、ル、モ、軍、備、ト、モ、人、口、多、ク、如、キ、ト、モ、豫、想、シ、テ、充、實、ス、ル、コト、
如、カ、メ、ル、ヘ、カ、ス、ト、信、ス、ル、者、ト、述、ベ、タ、ル、ニ、對、シ、總理、大臣、政府、於、
テ、本、條、約、對、シ、多、少、ノ、不、滿、アル、拘、束、之、調、節、ト、モ、本、條、
約、短、期、モ、カ、爲、リ、之、永、久、比、率、ヲ、ル、ヘ、ト、考、ヘ、ト、答、
ヘ、タ、リ、

次、テ、山、川、顧問、官、モ、本、條、約、成、立、ニ、ヨ、リ、米、國、何、程、負
擔、輕、減、ヲ、行、ハ、ル、ヤ、其、等、數、算、ハ、己、モ、未、定、ニ、答、ヘ、ト、
曾、同、リ、總理、大臣、モ、兵、力、補、充、付、テ、目、下、軍、部、於、

Dac 1124

96.26

研究之中ニ属シ大體ノコトスヲ申上得サルヲ遺憾トス
唯海軍、既定製艦計劃額ハ昭和五年迄ノ
予算ニ於テ五億円ナリキハ、四億円カクカ
ハ補充ト負擔輕減ト、財源トナル其割合
ハ今、所不明ナリ。然レトモ其一部ハ必ズ負擔
カ、輕減ニ差向ヘシト、答弁アリ同顧問官
全條約ニ依リテ認メラルル我國ノ制艦權ヲ
最向幹部ノ考入ナリト聞ク果シテ然ラハ
昭和十二年末迄ニ行使スル制艦權ノ噸數
十方六千噸ニシテ此ノ費用ハ約三億三千方円
ナリ以テ殘額ハ僅カニ七千万円ニ過キス。從テ
之ニ補充費ヲ加フルトモハ剩餘金ハ思ハ多額
ナル是金ヲ生スルニ到ルヘシ然モ本條約ニ依リ
テ斯ノ如キ大金ヲ要スルニ到ルベシトハ各新
聞ハ皆淵默ニシテ語ラス、自相ノ説明ハ官
全ク了解スルニシテ能ハサルトコトナリト論
スルヤ總理大臣ハ制艦權全部ヲ實行スル
ニ億円ヲ超過スモモ財政ニ顧問ニ適当ノ所
ニテ決行スベシト辯解ス同顧問官ハ更ニ
條約ニ伴フ財政上ノ計算ハ言フ迄無條
約ニ調印前ニ於テ爲メ補充計劃亦然リ
ト信ス紀元ニ海軍省並海軍令部ニ未ダニ
補充計劃ニシテ何ヤト論之し海軍大臣補充
計劃ハ有部ニ於テ夫々研究中ナリ

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兩者ノ協議調ヒ大藏省トモ相談ノ上ニアリサレハ申上テ
難シト答フ之ニ對シ同顧問官、當局ニハ既ニ定成セル
計劃アルヘキ筈ナリ而シテ今之ヲ提示セサルハ不解
ナリト考フト痛言ス

久保田顧問官ヨリ唯今、山川顧問官、御質問、
極メテ重要ナリト考フト本條約、根本的目的、國民
負擔ノ輕減ナルカ故ニ其、點ニ關スル本條約、成之、
結果ヲ考亮セサレハ斯ル會議ニ於テ調印ヲ爲スコト
能ハサレタリ當局、此ノ點ヲ中心トシテ答辯セリ
レハコトヲ請フ旨陳述セリ

伊東委員長兩餘、質問ハ次回ニ譲ル旨ヲ述ヘテ
閉會ヲ宣ス

(午後三時三十分閉會)

No. 29

doc 1124

千九百三十三年ロンドンの海軍條約御批准、件本、同審査委員會
昭和五年九月八日（月曜）本院事務所ニ於テ開會

出席者

倉宮田 議長

平沼 副議長

審査委員長

伊東 顧問官

來賓委員

金子 顧問官

久保田 顧問官

山川 顧問官

星田 顧問官

荒井 顧問官

河合 顧問官

水町 顧問官

開席者

田 顧問官

國務大臣

濱口 內閣總理大臣

財部 海軍大臣

幣原 外務大臣

三上 書記官長

堀江 書記官

武藤 書記官

no 28

(午後一時開會)

doc 1/24

伊東委員長開會ヲ宣ス

里田顧問官ヨリ今次ノ條約ニ規定スル各国ノ保有兵力量ハ何
ヲ基準トシテ協定ニタルヤトノ質問アリ海軍大臣ワシントン會
議ニ於テハ現有勢力ヲ又「エネーゴ」會議ニ於テモ我國ノ現有
勢力ヲ標準トシテ今國ハ英米兩國ハ英米「バウチ」高調セル
モ英國ハ大抵現有勢力ヲ標準トシ英國モ亦亦キ意味ニ於テ
現有勢力ヲ基準トシ我國モ亦大抵ニ於テ現有兵力ヲ標準ト
シタリト言ヒ得（シト答フルヤ同顧問官ハ曰ク、現有勢力
ヲ標準トスル米國ノ保有量タル（キ噸數ヲ算出シ又更ニ
米國ノ現有勢力ヲ基準トシタル場合、我國ノ保有量タル（キ
噸數ヲ指摘シ本條約カ其ノ何レモ依ルコトナク而モ我國ニ取り
極メテ不利ナル比率ノ保有兵力ニ同意シ英國ハ未タ一戰ヲ交ス
テ既ニ多數ノ艦船ヲ殲滅セラルカ如キ結果ニ至ルモ理由
ヲ質シ海軍大臣ハ權利上ヨリ言（何モ憚ル所ナキモ帝國政變ハ
「ワシントン」會議以來對米七割比率ヲ以テ足リト爲シ現ニ今次
「ワシントン」會議ニ對スル訓令ニ於テモ亦米總指七割ヲ基準トセルカ
故ニ我國ハ之ニ從ヒテ協定ニタルニテナリト答フ。

1029

又同顧問官ハ右觀全權カ米國「マート」ニ於ケル演說ニ引用シタル
「ワシントン」條約ノ軍縮精神ヲ説キ本條約ニ於テ新ニ巡洋艦
ニ割立金ニ對シ飛行機發着装置新設ヲ承認スルカキハ全ク
此ノ精神ニ矛盾スルモノニアラスヤ我全權ハ之ニ對シテ如何ナル態度
手段ヲ執「タルヤヲ訊シ海軍大臣ハ今次ノ會議ハ「ワシントン」ニ從
ハバ海軍士士モ米國ノ強硬ナル主張ニ同意ヲ表シタルモノナリト告
白セリ其ヨリ同顧問官ハ總理大臣ニ對シテ何カ故ニ當局者ハ國防
ニ缺陷ヲ生ス（本條約ニ調印ニタルヤ又其ノ缺陷ニ對シテハ如何

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ナリ對策ヲ有セラルルヤト、實質同ク發シ總理大臣條約、兵力量ノミ
ヲ以テミハ作戰用兵上或ハ不足アラシム制限外、兵力ヲ以テ之ヲ
補充シ得ニト信スルカ故ニ國防上ニハ斷シテ欲陷ヲ生セシメス矢
力補充ノ方法ハ種々アリハ内容ノ充實ニシテ他ハ術カノ向上ナリ
然レドモ其ノ具體的計劃ハ目下省部ニ於テ存案中ニ屬シ未ダ
發表スルノ時機ニ達セスト答辯ス

河合顧問官ヨリ潛水艦ハ世間ニ謂フ程有效ノモノニアラスト言ハ
ルモ我國ノ如キ地勢、國民性及經濟狀態ヲ有スル國ニ於テハ最も
必要有效ノモノナリト考フ然モ全ク性能ヲ異ニスル飛行機ヲ以テ之
ニ代ヘトスルハ所ナリ所以ヲ知ラズ油相ノ所見如何トノ實質同アリ油
軍大臣ハ潛水艦ノ戰術的價值ニ付テハ所論必ス之モ一定セスト云々
ノミト辯シ潛水艦ト航空機トノ性能ヲ對比シ其ノ得失ヲ説キ飛
行機ハ前途益々増進ナリト述フ之ニ對シテ同顧問官ハ油相ノ今
言ハ帝國海軍ノ策戰計畫ヲ非認スル結果トナラヌト論シ米國
ハ大戰後非常ノ進歩ヲ遂ゲル帝國ノ潛水艦ヲ恐ルルコト大ナルモ
ナラズ從テ帝國ニシテ現有潛水艦ヲ保有スル限リ米國ハ必スヤ我國
ニ戰ヲ挑ムコト無カルシ油相ハ次國ノ會議ニ於テ今次喪ハル潛
艦ヲ取戻ス成算アリヤト同顧問官大臣ハ海軍令部ニ於テハ潛艦不
足ハ航空機ヲ以テ補充スルコトニ決マリ次ノ會議ニ於テ對米比率
ヲニケルコト多ク見込キモ極力カカスベシト答フ次ニ同顧問官ヨリ
十九百三十六年ニ入ラ、對米比率ハ七割ヲ割ルニ到ルハ假令三十五年ノ
會議ニ於テ七割比率ヲ獲得シタリトスルモ我國ニトテ甚々不利
ナリ時期アルコト明白ナリ大凡國防要義ハ常備ヲ以テ變ニ供ヘ
百半响ト雖モ危險ニ曝スコトナキナリト信ス之ニ對スル油相ノ所見
如何又今日ト十九百三十六年後トニ於テハ製艦競争上ニハ非常ナル相
違アルヲ知ラサルハカラス一旦兵力ノ整備シタリ後ニ到リテ競争ニハ

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のこ

日本 米國ニ及ハサルベキハ調フ迄モ無カルベシ此ノ點ニ関スル海相ノ所見ヲ
庫ニト論述ス海軍大臣ハ若シ本條約ニシテ不成立ニ終ラハ乃チ米國ハ
日本ヲ敵視シ且何ヨリ艦艇競争ノ舉ニ出ツルコトナキヲ保ヤス
御説ノ如ク三十七年ノ次ニ到ラハハ砲巡洋艦ノ対米比率ハ六割ニ
低下シ且老齡トナルク其ノ際事ヲ起ラストハ斷言出来サルモハ砲
巡洋艦ハ必モハ砲巡洋艦ト太刀打ち出来サルモノニアラス駆逐艦四隻
アルハ必スハ砲巡洋艦一隻ハ止メテ見セト斷言スル將官サアット
答フ次ニ同僚同官ヨリ今次ノ會議ニ於テ我全权ハ主力艦ノ噸數
ニ備砲トノ低下ヲナスベキ訓令ヲ受ケテカラズラ現狀スルコトヲ得
サリシ経緯如何トノ傳聞アリ海軍大臣ヨリ今次ノ會議ニ於テハ
日本ハ主力艦噸數低下ヲ主張スルモ英米ハ英米ハ「バー」ノ眼目
トシ之ニ應ヤサリキトノ答辭アリ同僚同官ハ更ニ元來国防上ノ
缺陷ナルモハ其主張ヲ通ササレハ補充ノ途ナキモト考フ海相ノ之
妹ニ所見如何ヲ問ヒ海軍大臣ハ之ニ答テ国防上ノ缺陷ヲ新ス
ハ既定ノ国防方針ニ基テ用兵計畫ヲ其儘實施スレハ兵力量
ニ不足ヲ生ストノ意ナリ而シテ其不足ハ他ノモノヲ以テ補ヒ得サルニ
アラス假ニ七割ヲ保有ストスレモ必ス全勝トイフ譯ニハ「ア」スル令
ヲ令ノ戰ハ出来ルト云フ程度ナリ缺陷補充ノ計畫ニ付テハ軍事
參議院會議ニ於テ全會一致ヲ以テ決セリコトナリ同意ナシト考フ
ト答フ次ニ同僚同官ハ補充ニ依リ国防上ハ缺陷ナキコトナリヤト
確メ海軍大臣然リト答フ
山川同僚同官ヨリ先日濱口總理ヨリ兵力量ノ決定ニ付海軍大臣事
務管理ト加藤軍令部長トノ間ニ意見ノ一致アリト答辭セラル
ル議會ニ於テハ軍令部長ノ意見ヲ斟酌シタリト謂ハラル事案アリ
而シテ此ノ斟酌ナル日東諸ノ意見我ヲ考フルニ我國ニ於テ最モ信用
蜂書言旨海ニハ斟酌トハ昭シ合セテ取捨スルコトナリトアリ

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又大日本國語大辭典ニ、彼此參酌、之取舍、ミトナリトナリト同意ト、
到底並立セザル觀念ナリ、何レ果シテ事實ナリヤト、質問アリ、依テ總理大臣
伊東本員長ニ對シ、發言、許可ヲ求メタルモ、統帥權問題、暫ク留保
セリ、故ニ後刻ニ願ヒタリト述ヘテ許可セザリシニ、由リ同顧問官、輕シテ海軍
大臣ニ對シ、今我海軍最高權威、一致セル者、條約、兵力量ニテハ、欠
アリト認ムルヤ否ヤヲ訊、同大臣、條約ニ、兵力量、兵力、種類ニ依リテ
是不足アルハ、故ニ彼此融通シテ高不足、部令、出来ニテ補充スルコトニ
決セリト續ク説述スルヤ同顧問官、同軍事ニ然リ然ラスト答辯セハコトヲ
求メ、仍テ同大臣、數字上ニ、兵力、不足アリトモ、國防上ニ、欠陥ヲ生ゼシメ
スト答フ同顧問官、更ニ國防上ニ、欠陥ヲ生ゼシメスト云フモ、開ハ次ニ吾ニ過
キミテ、無理ニタル兵力量、即チ最量、モノニアラズ、同大臣、次ニ吾ノ
モトヲヘテ、可ナルモノニテ國防上、目的ヲ達スルコトヲ得ヘト答フ
次テ金子顧問官ヨリ、首相、考ヘラルル國防、國防ノ通義ト意味、異
ニテ、所謂國防トハ、ナニヨナルヲモスニテ、外國軍ヨリ侵セラルトキ
ニテ、防ウカ、國防ナリ、首相、誤ウカ、如キ經濟、外交等、國防ニアラス、海軍
大臣、云ニル國防、觀念ハ如何ト、省エテ總理大臣ヨリ、昌言ニ述ヘタル、
廣義我國防ナリ、國防、通義、御誤、如シト辯明ス
山川顧問官ヨリ、海相、條約、依ル我國防、次ニ吾ノモト、答ヘコトカ
全權出發、際此、要求、國防、日最低限度ナリト説明セリ、果シテ
次ニ吾ノモト、可ナリトセ、最低限度ト述ヘタル、虚言トシ、海軍、最
高權威、或兵力、補充ニテ、吾國防、全クニ得ヘト為セリヤト、質
問アリ、海軍大臣ヨリ、然リ完全ニアラズ、モ、吾國防、ナリ得ヘト答フ
更ニ同顧問官、勝敗、決定セラルル要素、多クアルモ、他、要素、ハ、如
ク同ト見做シ、之ニ又、兵力量アリ、之令、之令、戰ヲ為シ得ヘト
云フ兵力量、標準トシテ、國防計劃、最低限度トヘシ、全權ニ對
シ、政府、訓令、即チ此、標準ナリ、從テ其、訓令ヨリ、讓歩スルハ、

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五分五分、戦、お事サルト、トナツサル（カラスト論スルヤ同大臣、畧
々五分五分、戦争カお事見エナリト述フ依テ同顧問、良、
畧ナルカ故ニ五分五分ノ戦、お事サルトニアフスヤト反
問、同大臣、御意見尤モナレトモ畧ト云フハ決シテ不正確
ニアラス本官等ハ無論具任ヲ執得ルモノナリト考ヘ居
リト述ヘタシトモ同顧問、良ハ本條、^{評ス}戦田ニ
於テ為ス計画、最初、計画、^{対比ス}ハ、前者力
最善ニシテ後者、^{次善}ナリト考ヘサルヲ得スト断セリ
且、^{最後ニ總理大臣ヨリ條約ニ依ル}兵力、^量ニテ、不足
ナリトハ、既定、国防方針ニ基ラズ、^策戦計劃、^{維持}
遂行スルニ、兵力不足ナリトハ、意味ナリ国防上、
欠陥トハ、事目ヲ別ナリト^{辨明}ス
伊東、本委員、長官、質問アル（モモ本日ハ之ニ閉
會ス）^{シト宣ス}
(午後三時五十分閉會)

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no. 34

千九百三十年「ロンドン」海軍條約御批准、件第九回審査委員會
昭和五年九月十日（水曜日）本院事務所に於て開會

出席者

倉富議長

平沼副議長

審査委員長

伊東顧問官

審査委員

金子顧問官

久保田顧問官

山川顧問官

黒田顧問官

荒井顧問官

河合顧問官

水町顧問官

閣席者

田顧問官

國務大臣

濱口内閣總理大臣

財部海軍大臣

幣原外務大臣

二上書記官長

堀江書記官

武藤書記官

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No. 35

(午後二時開會)

伊東委員長開會ヲ宣メ

金子顧問官ヨリ全權本條約ニ調印スル際之ニ依リ我國民負擔何程減却ナルハ既ニ調査セラルト信スル其金額何程ナト問ニ海軍大臣當時、胸算ヲ述ベシト本條約成立及不成立場合ニ於テ經費大要ヲ述フ同顧問官更ニ本條約ニ依ル補助艦ニ要スル維持費額調査ヲ求メ荒井顧問官ヨリ亦本條約成立不成立兩場合ニ於テ經費額ヲ問フ總理大臣ヨリ海軍大臣、答辯ヲ補足シ其算出困難ナル事情及減少額殆ト皆無キ旨ヲ答フ次ニ水町顧問官ヨリ維持費計算困難ノ條ト補充費財源ニ付質問シ總理大臣ヨリ昭和六年度ヨリ同十年度迄、繼續費トシ計スルニ億八千萬圓カ其財源トシ譯サト答ル同顧問官其財源ヲ如何ニ確保スルニ問ニ同省相結極部省協議ヲ經大藏外務兩大臣トモ協議シ之ヲ六補充費減稅額共決定サル旨ヲ答フ

山川顧問官ヨリ數字ヲ掲ゲテ國防費ヲ論シ本條約上ノ權利ヲ行ハ殘金六千萬圓トナシ之ヲ七年ニ按分スハ七年千萬圓トナル此如キ少額ヲ持テ飛行機其他施設ヲ行ハ國防ノ安全ヲ期シ得ルヤ而シテ之ヲ負擔スル國民負擔輕減不能トシニスト質問アリ總理大臣ヨリ代艦權全部ヲ行フニヤ未定問題ナリト答辯アリ

次ニ荒井顧問官ヨリ調印後已ニ五月ヲ経過スル今日同豫算大綱ニ定メラルヤ訊ニ海軍大臣未ト答フ其ヨリ同顧問官本案ニ補充計畫如何ヲ問フ賛否ヲ決シ難キ故豫算編成期ニ審査ヲ延期スノ外ニ延期若シ不可ナハ其輪廓ヲ示シ之ヲ示テ繼續ヲ執ラヌコトヲ水町顧問官ヨリ亦同様ト希望シ海軍大臣ヨリ之ニ本條約締結ノ際主力艦六割ニハ我國防ニ缺陷ヲ生ズル補助艦ヲ制限セラル故又障ナトシ御諮詢ヲ奏請シタル當時秘密ノ條ニ補助艦計劃提示要本ナリ方故ニ今回亦同様ニ然ルベト考メ居タリト述フ

金子顧問官ヨリ米國上院ノ報告ニ依リ米國ニ審議ハスル潜水艦ニ

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日本潜水艦ヲ減殺スル程米國ノ優勢ナルト云ヘリ、日本ニテ潜水艦ヲ有ス
ハ米國亦ハハ是ニテ世界ノ平和ヲ國際信義ニ表面ノ禮儀、ミ兵カノ充實ニテ
ハ能ク平和ノ保ツカラスト述ヘ潜水艦、必要ヲ論スルヤ總理大臣、條約ニ付
議論ハ特東對米六制ニ均束サル度又潜水艦減勢、二點ハミ制限外
天備整備ニ依リ國防上不安ヲ生ジルコトヲ得ヘシト、海軍大臣ト軍令部長ト、
致スル意見ナリト述ヘ政府ヲ信シテ審議ヲ進メコトヲ希望ス。
荒井顧問官、更ニ補充計劃又減稅、概算ヲ示サントラホ、海軍大臣之
應ニ難キ所以ヲ述ヘ
金子顧問官、國防計劃、軍令部長、直轄事務ニテ勅裁ヲ經フル後之ヲ
海軍大臣ニ移スモノト從テ、内閣ヲ責任ヲ持ツ故安心シトハル理由ヲ解スル
ニ能ハスト論ス
右終テ伊東委員長、閉會ヲ宣ス
(午後四時閉會)

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千九百三十年「ロ」海軍條約御批准件第十回審査委員會

昭和五年九月十二日(金曜日)本院事務所於了開會

出席者

倉富議長

平沼副議長

審査委員長

伊藤顧問官

審査委員

金子顧問官

久保田顧問官

山川顧問官

黒田顧問官

田顧問官

荒井顧問官

河合顧問官

水町顧問官

國務大臣

濱口内閣總理大臣

成田海軍大臣

幣原外務大臣

三上書記官長

堀江書記官

武隈書記官

No. 1124.

(午後二時開會)

伊東委員長開會ヲ宣シ質問ヲ繼續ス

河合顧問官ヨリ前軍令部長カ兵力補充計劃ヲ立テタリトテ必

シ其カ本案ノ兵力ニ不同意ナリサル證據トハナリサル次第ヲ
論シ且補充ニヨリテ果ニ國防不安ナキヲ得ヘキヤト、質問

アリ海軍大臣ヨリ四月二日、加藤軍令部長、帷幄上奏、軍
事參議院、奉答文、主旨ト毫末モ異ナリス又其、聲明

書モ亦之ニ矛盾スルモノニテラストト同聲明書ヲ朗讀シ更

ニ軍事參議官會議、奉答文、内容ニ付自己了解シ

タル所トシ本條約ノ協定兵量ヲ以テシテ、既定、國防計

劃ヲ維持シ之ニ基キ策戰ヲ遂行スル上ニ、缺陷ヲ生ス縱

テ本條約成立、上、常ニ協定兵量ヲ維持スヘキ、勿論航空

兵力、充實、制限外艦船整備、其他一般兵力、内容、

充實ト術カ、向上トニ努カスル、必要アリ而シテ右、對策

ニテ遂行セラルトキ、當面、情勢ニ於テ國防上畧々差支

ナキモノト認ムル旨ヲ述テ更ニ同顧問官ヨリ加藤軍令部

長、聲明書ニイフ善處、意味ハ之ヲ種々ニ解スルコト

ヲ得ヘク必シモ之ヲ以テ兵力量ニ不同意ナシトノミ、解

得サルヘシト述テ既ニ新軍令部長ニ於テ補充計劃ヲ

立テタリトセ、何カ故ニ之ヲ提示シ得サルヤト質シ總理大

臣ヨリ本協定、兵力量ヲ以テシテ、既定、策戰計劃、

遂行上不足ヲ生スルモ短期條約ナレ、相當、補充、實

行ヲ爲セ、國防上、不安、畧々、之ヲ掃スルコトヲ得ヘ

シト信ス短期ナレ、補充、道アルカ故ニ之ニ調印シタル

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1124 モ、ナリト述ヘ海軍大臣ヨリ今日直ニ軍部ノ補充案ヲ提
示スルニ困難ナリト答フ

次ニ山川顧問官、海相、過日河合顧問官、同ニ對シ
其ノ事、加藤大將ノ名譽ニ關スル故答ヘスト述ヘラシタ
ルニ拘ラス本日、同大將、終始一貫何等ノ變節ナシ
ト、御答ナルカ果シテ然ラ、何事カ大將ノ名譽ニ關ス
ルヤト問ニ海軍大臣ヨリ六月十日參内上奏シタル時、
シトラ名譽、タノ話サスト申述ヘタルノミト答フ依テ
同顧問官、兵力量關係以外ニ於テ非君子ノ行動
ヲ執リシコトヲ云ハスト解シテ宜シキヤト尋ネ海軍
大臣、至尊ト、關係ニシテ一身ノ出所進退ニ關スル
モノナリ直接兵力量ニ關スルモノニアラズト答フ
此ニ於テ同顧問官、出所進退ノコトハ士君子ノ最
モ明カニスベキ所ナリト論シ次テロビドニニ於テ若
槻スチンソン西全權會見、際スチンソン氏、若槻氏
ノ主張スル所ヲ大ニ憤リテ若槻氏ヨリ同氏ニ交附ラ
ル文書ヲ其、面前ニ於テ引裂テ之ヲ投棄シタリト
イフ事實、有無ヲ質シ海軍大臣、之ヲ肯定シ具体
的事實ヲ陳述ス

更ニ同顧問官、明治元年前後日本ノ外務省ニ於
テ暴行シタルハクス、事例ヲ引テ士君子タル者、
儀禮ヲ論シ且米國ヲ正義國、如ク田心惟セルハ、
迷信ナリ外務省邊ニハ斯ル迷信者ナキヤト問
ニ又日本人、極メテ好戰國民、如ク誤解スル

Doc 1124

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No

者アルモ日本、今ヨリ三百三十三年前天草、乱以後御
門、戦之三百三十三年間、太平ヲ保チ其、後僅カニ長
州征伐、函館戦争、西南戦争、二日清、日露、日獨
外役ヲ加テ六回、戦争ヲ爲シタルニ過キス之ニ反
北米合衆國、獨立以來僅カ百五十五年、間ニ獨立戦
争ヲ始メトシ英米戦争、墨西可戦争、南北戦争、
西班牙戦争、又米獨戦争、合計六回、戦争
ヲ行ヘルヲ以テ米國、日本ニ比シ二倍強、戦争ヲ
爲セルモノニシテ口ニ人道正義ヲ高唱スルモ決
シテ正義人道ヲ行フモノニアラス然ルニ十九百二
十六年ニハ二テ條ノ日支條約ヲ無効トシ滿鐵
實收ヲ企テ資金、同鐵道ヲ擔保トシテ米國ヨ
リ借款スルニ到ルヘク從テ滿洲鐵道及東清鐵
道ハ米國ノ支配ニ屬スルニ到リ日本ハ終ニ滿蒙
ヨリ退却スル、己ムナキニ至ルヘシ世人動モスル采
國ヲ人道國ノ如クニ思惟セルモ決シテ然ラス口
トシ條約ノ批准ニ関スル米國上院、議事記
録ニ依リハ、フラス大將、自年ヲ經サルニ我
國ハ支那ノ爲ニ戦フコトアルヘシト述ベテ我
百年トハ、英語上、修辭ニシテ遠カラサル内
ニトイフ意ナリ米國要路、大官ヨリ此ノ言漏
ル誰カ曰米國ニ戦争ナシト断言、得ルモノ
而シテ斯ル戦争ヲ未然ニ防止スルノ道ハ唯軍
備ヲ整フル、一事ニアリ我軍備、不整ハ

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尚忍つべしト又モ之ヲ爲日米戦争若起、間隙
ヲ作ルコトナキヤヲ深慮ス今ナシク海軍軍備ヲ
十分ニスルコト能ハサルヤト實ニ外務大臣、外務省ニ
ハ御話ノ如キ迷信者ナシト求メ若槻全權カニマ
トルニ於テ爲シタル演説ノ筆記ヲ朗讀シテ其趣
旨ニ賛同スルコトヲ詔リ又二十箇條問題ヲ説明
シテ米國カ目ツ同條約ニ均霑スルコトヲ認メタルハ
畢竟同條約ノ効力ヲ認メタル結果第二過キスト爲
ラント大將ヲ百年内ニ支那ノ爲ニ戦フカ知スト
イフモ米國ハ支那ニ爲ニ戦フコト無カルベシト信スト
生ケ日米戦争ヲ避ケケニハ軍備ヨリモ他日國力
ヲ増大スルコトカハ要ナリト云フルモ日ヲ牽連ス之ニ
對シテ同顧問官ハ本官モ國力ハ如何ナルモ不可ナ
シト考ヘス然レトモ本條約成立スルハ必ス民力涵
養セリ成之セサルハ負擔ヲ輕減スルコト能ハスト、
考ヘス寧ロ此ノ條約ヲ破棄スルハ金力浮クニマ
ラサルヤ米國上院、外交委員會、速記録ヲ見
レ、何レモ異口同音ニ米國ハ西太平洋ニ活動スヘ
ク而シテ之ヲ妨グルモノハ日本ナリト云ヘリ西太平
洋トハ支那一コトニシテ畢竟日本海軍ヲ亡ササ
ルベカラスト謂フコトニ外ナラス本官ハ未タ満足
ナルハ合辭ヲ得サレトモ之ニテ質問ヲ打切リ

1041

次述フ
總理大臣起キテ山川顧問官ハ本條約ノ兵力

Doc 1124

量及之カ補充ニテ、國防上不安ナリト謂ハルモ何
國ト雖完全ナル軍備ヲ有スル國家ニアラサルヘ
我國、軍事専門家ハ之ニ五分五分ノ戦ハ去
来ル天ノトナセリ日本、能ク是ニ依テ會議力決裂
スニ造艦競争、覺悟ヲ要シ造艦競争トナシ、
勢力増強外ナラズ斯クテ到底國力ヲ續カサルヘ
シト考ヘラレ又或ハ之カ爲ニ戦争ヲ惹起スル
アアルヘシト論述スル山川顧問官ハ更ニ製造艦
競争トナル虞アリカ故ニ日本ハ米國ニ屈服セ
サヘカラストノ御食タルカ千九百三十六年ニ對
米ハ割トナリヤカテハ五割トナリ戦ハスルテ屈
ヤサル可カラサルニ到ルヘ本官ハ此ノ邊ニ決心
スノ外ナシト考フルカ如何ト述フ久保田顧問官ハ
國防ニハ兵備、外交及外交ヲ要スルヲ知識ト
精神カ最モ必要ナリ然レ國際關係、會議ヲ
解決スルニハ尤極兵カニ訴フルノ外ナシ日本ク今
日其界ニ重キヲ爲セルハニ日本ノ兵力ノ巨
トニ會議ハ英米兩國カ其界ノ平和負担輕
減ハ美名ノモトニ斜眼ニ行フ天ノナリ唯恐
シハ日本ノ兵力ナルカ故ニ今次、統帥權問題
ニ付テハ自取モ憂慮ヲ爲セルモ兵力量、決定ニ付
テハ海軍大臣ト軍令部長、意見一致ヲ要シ、
同訓ニ際シテモ西首、意見一致ヲ要シ、
大臣、合辭ヲ聞キサカラストナセリト述フ

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次テ金子顧問官ハ本官ハ外務大臣、御答ヲ聞
ニ益々憂ヒテ深キ本官ノ知ル所ニ依リ米國ハ大作日中ニ
及テナリ日露戦争ノ當時ニ於テハ朝鮮ハ日本ハ併合シ滿洲
ハ滿鉄ヲ基本トシテ日本ニ於テ之ヲ開發スルカ至當ナリト謂ヘモ
タツト大統領トナルヤ方針ニ變シ米國ハ自ラ瑣瑣鐵道ヲ
建設セムトシタルモ日本ノ反對ニ置ニテ果サス爾來滿洲ヲ以テ
米國側産品トシテ揚場ヲツキトシツアリ、斯クテ米國ノ
商人ハ止キ將來ニ於テ日米ハ戦ハルベカラズ東ニシヤト其、
他太平洋沿岸ニ船渠ヲ造リ準備ヲ整フルハ必要アリト叫ビ
又彼ノ石油不正事件ニ関シ米國ノ一様事ハ公廷ニ於テ亦日米
戦争アリト、電報ヲ朗讀シタルコトナリ而シテ大正十三年秋
關東ニ大地震アリ國民慘害ニ困ル時米國ノ上下院ハ東洋
人排斥移民法ヲ通過セシメタル事實アリ米國ノ歴史ハ正
ニ斯ノ如シ然レモ先刻外務大臣ハ米國人カ自覺スルトキアルコ
ト論セラルタルハ甚々不の解ナリ而シテ日米ノ干係ハ三十七年
頃カ最モ危期ナリ父スヤ米國ハ又耶ト相提携ニテ滿鉄ヲ實取
リ日本勢力ヲ滿蒙ヨリ逐拂ハトス（シ之ヲ以テロンド）條
約ニヨリ矢カ、缺陷ヲ補フハ極メテ重要ナルコトナリ、惟ツ三國
ト國トノ間ニ於テハ正義感ハ在リ、禮儀ニシテ最後ハ兵力アル
ニ日本カ治外法權ヲ撤廢シ得タルハ全ク日清戦争、賜
物ナリ又之ヲ和蘭カ由リ世界ノ富國ヲ以テ知ラレタルニ拘ラ
ス今日遂ニ三強國トナレハ其ノ兵備ヲ制限セラルカ爲
ナリ、然レ日本カ大強國トシテ世界ニ進出スルコトヲ得タル
ハ全ク軍人ノ賜物ナリ、ボツクス、條約モ全ク我軍勝利ノ

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賜物ナリ。明治三十二年本官が我新憲法ヲ擧ヘテ歐洲ニ渡リ
 各国憲法ヲ覽者、批評ヲシタルニ第十二條ト第十三條トハ
 最も彼等ノ注意ヲ引キ斯ノ如キ憲法ハ世界無比ニシテ
 皇帝自ラ兵隊ノ大權ヲ掌握スルハ日本ノ之ニ全ク特殊
 ナル日本歴史ノ成果ニシテ歐洲諸國ノ均ニ得ルコト能ハサ
 ズモノ本條サハハ兵權ノ確保ハ確立セラルヘントテ深ク此ノ
 規定ヲ嘆美スナリ。国防ハ國家生命ノ保障其ノ欲陷ハ最も
 恐ルヘキモノニシテ日本ノ兵制ハ正ニ日本ノ志氣精神及國
 體ニ基テ日本ノ特色ナルハ飽クテ其ノ完備ヲ期セサルヘカ
 ラスロンドン條約カ三十二年以後ニ於ケル日本壓迫準備ナル
 トハ米國上院ノ演説ニヨリテ既ニ疑フ餘地ナシト論述ス
 伊東委員長開會ヲ宣ス

(午後四時開會)

十九百三十二年ロンドン海軍條約御批准件才十回審査委員會
 昭和五年九月十五日(月曜日)本院事務所ニ於テ開會

出席者

倉田議長

平沼副議長

審査委員長

伊東顧問官

審査委員

金子顧問官

久保田顧問官

山川顧問官

里田顧問官

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荒井顧問官

河合顧問官

水町顧問官

關 席 者

田

顧問官

國務大臣

濱口內閣總理大臣

財部海軍大臣

幣原外務大臣

三上書記官長

堀江書記官

武藤書記官

(午後一時開會)

伊東委員長開會ヲ宣フ

黒田顧問官ヨリ政府ヨリ軍令部ニ好シ一丸ノリトノ事

ノ事實果シテ如何トノ實向アリ總理大臣團訓際若シ

原案ニ通リ決定セハ國防計畫ノ内容ニ美及術力向上等

是々ノ事項ニ付命令ヲ應ヤリ度ハ海軍ヨリ書面ヲ以テ申

出アリタルニ由リ周議ヲ經ハ右ノ案上ヲ應スキ日ヲ答ヘタル

日ヲ答フ更ニ同顧問官ヨリ當局ニ屢々改修ノ主眼ニ於テ

兵力量ヲ決定セリト述ベタルニ右ノ如何ナル意味ナリヤ軍令

部長ノ同意ナクシテハ決定スルコト能ハサルニアラスヤトノ實向

アリ海軍大臣ヨリ軍令部長ノ同意ヲ要スト云フニ日ヲ答フ

110 45-

Dec 11/24

No 46

同同顧問官ヨリ海軍局ノ答辯ニ依リハ國庫ノ意見一致ナリ
トコトナリ右ハ具體的ニ意見一致ヲ得タリト意見ナリ右ヤ
實ニ海軍大臣ヨリ具體的ニ目下交渉中ナリト答フ
次ニ荒井顧問官ト海軍大臣トノ間ニ本條約成立及不成立
ノ場合ニ依リハ財政干渉ニ係リ殊ニ成立後ニ依リハ補充費ト減
税トノ金額ニ係リ數字ヲ用ニテ同答ヲ重ニ以テ大數ヲ明ニ
スルコトハ本條約ヲ批判スルニ必要ナリハ概算書ノ提示ヲ要メ
タルニ對シ補充ニ關スル數字ハ尙未定ニシテ豫算編成期
ニ到ラザレハ発表ニ難シト答辯ス思ハ田顧問官ヨリモ亦其ノ
提示ニ必要ナリト海軍大臣ヨリ則チ右答同様に答フ
次ニ金子顧問官ヨリ國防兵力ニ關シテ明治二十九年三月伊藤總
理大臣ト陸海軍大臣トノ間ニ取交サルノ書アリ其ノ旨ハ惟懼上奏
ハ一度モ内閣ニ相談セラルト云々然ル内閣ニ對シテ國防兵力ニ
關スル下金アルヲ例トシタリ然ルニ右文書ニ依リ費用ヲ要スル事項
ニ係リハ豫メ内閣ニ内示スルコトナリ又當目ニ東鄉軍令部長
ト奧村參謀總長トヨリ陸海軍擴張ニ惟懼ニ奏アリ其ノ御裁可
カ而テ内閣ニ降リシトキモ亦財政ノ關係ト元帥會議ヲ開キ
漸ク以テ之ヲ實施スルニ決シタルコトナリモ國防用兵ニ關スル
處理ノ決定ニ係リハ當目軍令部長參謀本部ニ決セリ本案
ハ軍部ニ依リ一致ノ補充計畫案ノ大綱ナリヤト質問アリ總理
大臣ヨリ屢々申セシ如ク兵力補充ノ計畫ハ財政ノ關係ヲ離レテ
成立セスト答フ同同顧問官ヨリ今次ノロンドン會議ニ由リ
生スル豫算剩餘金額及軍門家ノ要スル兵力量ト大要
ニ係リ質問アリタルモ海軍大臣ハ再度申上ルニ通リ唯今御答不
下能ハサルヲ遺憾トスト答フ續テ同顧問官ト海軍大臣トノ
間ニ潜水艦不足ニ對シテ飛行機ニ依リ補充ニ關シ數次ノ同答

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ヲ重不次同敵同官ハ更ニ在條約未ニ終シハ日本ハ拱手ニテ
 米國カ大巡十五隻又テ竣工スルヲ待ツモ、ニシテ而モ米國ニ付ハ軍縮
 ニアラスニテ及テ軍擴ナリ此點ロンドン會議ニ於テハ何モ一
 議論ナカリヤト實ニ海軍大臣ハ米國ハ既成大巡艦ハ二隻上
 トモ建造中ノモノヲ加シ十何隻又至ニ豫算ニ計セラルモ、
 加フハ三十三隻ナリ、我代艦ハ最初之ヲ十隻止メタルモ及ハ
 十隻ニ定メシ故ニ現在ヨリ三ハ軍縮ト謂ヒ得ヘト答フ
 後ニ於テ同敵同官ハ米國ハロンドン會議ニ終リ軍備ノ擴
 張ヲ行シタル事實ヲ數明シ米國ハ本條約ニ終リテ始メタル
 ス、取シタル艦隊ヲ止ムニエト得ルニ到ルヤヲ説述ス其ハ敵同
 官ヨリ海軍大臣ト軍令部ト一致ニテ補充計出ヲ固キタル
 尙本米國會議ハ之ヲ豫算編成ノ完了スル迄延期スルトキハ何カ
 特ニ支障ノ虞ナリヤト質問シ總理大臣ヲ豫算編成ニ待ツコト
 能ハス本米、御諮詢者ニハ政局不安トナリ引續キ財界ノ不
 安ノ虞ニ到ルヘク現ニ本年下半期ニ入リテ正金ノ流出多ク深ク
 配慮ニツアル次第ナリト答テス

次テ健康委員長ハ九月十八日以來委員會議ヲ開クニ計二十回
 ニ及ビ諸種ノ問題ニ付賛同意決ヲ重ニテ審査ヲ進メタリ
 兵力増強ノ決定ニ付軍部ノ同意得タリヤ否ノ問題トナリ總
 理大臣ニ繰返シ同意シタルモノト認メタルニ日言明セシタルモ其
 事實ニ付疑ヲ抑シモノニナリ加藤氏ハ停年續ヲ懇請シ
 ルモ當局ニ之ニ應テシカレ故ニ本校ノ職權ヲ以テテハ直接
 事實ヲ究明スル能ハサルニ到リ然レトモ海軍大臣ハ兵力
 増強ニ關スル處理ニ付テハ軍部一致ヲ要トシテ自裁ヲ仰

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No 48

内閣其通牒ヲ受理セリト求ヘタルヲ以テ統帥權
付テ未ダ同答ナキ事能ス如クナル以上日原
其提示ヲ要求スルノ必要ナキト了承セラレタ
コトヲ以テ本條ノ案國議上ニ要件タル補充並ニ
財政計畫ニ付テハ政府能マテ之ヲ提スルコト
過信スルコトハ本院ノ職責上爲ニ能ハサルコトナ
リ然ルニ前同案審查ノ際海軍大臣ヨリ本條ノ
ニ關スル軍事案ヲ議院ニ奉命文ト内合ニ付陳
求アリ該陳述ニ依リ同文ニ兵カ補充ニ
關スル事項アルコト確實ニシテ而モ其ノ事タル
本條ニ對シテ具體否ヲ決スルニ至ト唯一ナル
カ故ニ委員會ニ於テ研頭之ヲ要求セムト爲タル
ル天爲ニ或ハ議事ニ停頓ヲ来サントモ爲タル
事得ヘク自然政府自發ニ依リ提出セルコト
ヲ希ミ今日及ベルモ同文ハ既ニ海相自ラ其
内容ヲ敘述セラレタル以上之ヲ樞府ニ提出スルニ何
ノ支障アルキニアラス依テ本日改メテ右奉答
文ノ提出ナラシムルニ依テ本國務ニ屬
スルハ故ニ内閣總理大臣ニ示アラセラルベキ
ト信スルカ故ニ之ヲ提示セラルハ正ニ内閣ノ責
務ナリト考テ政府何故ニヤ其ノ提示ヲ重大視
セラルモ宜シク誠意ヲ示シテ奉命文提示ノ
手續ヲ執ラシ度若ハ孰カノ上書面ヲ以テ同
答アリコトヲ均クヒ日ヲ論述ス之ニ對シテ内閣

總理大臣、今般帥權問題ニ関スル議會、答辯
 ヲ本院ニ於テ一總論タルト求メテ之ヲ用
 諸ヲ遺憾ニタルニシテ主義ヲ變更タルモノニ
 了ス補充並減税ノ程度ニ付テハ目下當局ニ於
 テ調査文書中ナルヲ以テ之ヲ代表スルニ能ハ
 ス政府信スル所ニ依リ斯ル書類ハ審査資料
 トシテ提出スルノ義務ナキモノトス尤モ完成セル書
 類ハ之ヲ提出スルコトヲ妙ケサルモ未だ完成ナルカ
 故ニ今之ヲ提出スルコト能ハス本案御下付、
 當時議長ヨリ奉命ニテ審査會上ニ提出スル旨
 ニ付委員ニ之ヲ附託スル前提示セラルコトヲ旨
 申出アリタルモノハ政府ノ平許ニ思ヒテナカ
 ニ提出スルコト能ハス寧ろ寧ろ委員會ヲ開カシ大
 臣、説明ヲ聴取セ度旨答ヘタリ然レニ今又委員
 長ヨリ御要求ヲ受テタルカ過日海軍大臣ヨリ斷々
 ノ意見ヲ以テ奉答文ニ禁身成ニタル旨續述セラル
 タルカ故ニ此ノ程度ニテ其満足セラルコトヲ希シス強
 テ御要求スルハ郎時拒絕スルノ外ナシト斷言ス
 伊東委員長開會ヲ宣ス
 (午後三時開會)

No 49
 千九百三十年ノ下ニ海軍條約御批准ノ件第
 十二回審査委員會
 昭和五年九月十七日(水曜日)本院事務所
 ニ於テ開會

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女部音

平沼副議長

平沼副議長

沈同同 1984.12.15

伊東顧問所

宋曹本直宋女頌

金子鎮岡

久保田 顧問官

山川頽閣

五、田、銀、明、官

田、顏、郎

荒井 禎司 官

河合顏問答

水田

11-11-19

二 上 書 院 官 廳

据江 李自 志

武庫書院

$\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2}$

1

$$10 \pi \text{ 個} / \text{シカク} = 12$$

夫言二由一而生

$\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}$

杜唱會日三二五

月也廿九力故二本院

$$A \vdash N \equiv \text{true} \quad \text{if } N \text{ is a constant}$$

10 = 10

PURL: <http://www.elsevier.com/locate/bsc>

NO 50

(午後一時開會)

伊東妻貞長開會ヲ宣_ノシカ_ニ協_ニ議_スニ入_ル

久保田閣官、発言ニ由リ委員長ヨリ先

[illegible]

五、五府合議年十二月廿五日委員會日三十一要均生之兒座甫

資料、提出に止るセザルカ故ニ本院、権限ニ

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40.51

作成スル、外ナカルヘシ甚シキ必要ナル審査資料
ノ提出ナキ、故ヲ以テ本案ノ審査不能ナリト爲
スヘカラサルニテナサルヘキモ斯ノ如キ態度ハ果シ
テ本院ノ面目ヲ失スルニ到ルコト無キヤ疑問ニ属シ
又本條約ノ破棄案ニモ論據ニ乏シキ嫌アリカ故ニ
報告書ノ一部ニ軍部ト充分ナル協調ヲ整ヘ國防
ノ補充計劃ヲ遂行シ且人民ノ負擔輕減ヲ實行
シテ本條約ノ目的ヲ達スルニ遺憾ナキヲ期スルニ於
テハ御批准アリテ然ルヘキ旨ヲ記載シ本案ニ對
スル軍部及政府ノ責任ノモトニ批准ノ奏請ヲ爲サム
ルヲ可トスト思料ス
之ニ對シテ黒田、若井兩顧問官ヨリ意見、陳述
リ河合顧問官ヨリ國防計劃ノ完成スルマデ
本案ノ査定ヲ延期ニテハ如何トノ發言アリ田顧
問官ヨリ奉答文ト補充並財政計劃トヲ知ル
コト能サルハ甚々遺憾ナリ然レトモ本院トシテハ能
クマテ相當ノ奉答ヲ爲スカ本當ナリト考フルカ故ニ
此ノ場合委員長、御意見、如ク爲スノ外ナカルヘシ
甚シキ本院ノ職責ハ之ヲ以テ盡サレタリモト信ス
トノ陳述アリ山川顧問官ハ本條約ニ依リ我兵
力量ハ遂ニ對米六割トナリ萬一戰爭トナシ我國
力敗北スヘキカ故ニ更ニ熟考スル爲今日ノ決定ヲ
延期シテ述フ之ニ對シテ伊東委員長ヨリ
所見ノ陳述アリ同顧問官ハ更ニ委員會ノ意見
カ本會議ヲ通過スルト否トハ決シテ委員會、
面目ニ関スルモ、ニアラサルヘシト論シ委員長トノ

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問ニ二三、問答アリ次テ水師顧問官ヨリ審査ノ
資料不足ハ遺憾トスルモ財界ノ近況尋常ト
ウサルモノアル折柄委員長ノ所見ニ全然賛成スル
旨ヲ述ヘ金子顧問官ハ憲法第十一條及第十二
條ノ法意ヲ説キ憲法制定當時ノ経緯ヲ述ヘ
兵力量ハ帷幄上奏ニ依リテ決スヘク内閣ニ於テ
定ムヘキモノニアラサルコトヲ強調ス久保田顧問官
ハ山川顧問官ノ御意見尤ナシトテ事態已ラ
得サルカ故ニ成可ク一致ノ行動ヲ執リ數ヲ以テ
決テ争フカ如キコト無キ様爲メ度旨ヲ述ヘ山
川顧問官之ニ同意ス其ヨリ

更ニ委員間ニ於テ協議ヲ重ネタル結果ニ委
員長ノ所見ノ通り本安未ヲ可決スルコトニ決ス
伊東委員長ハ報告安未査閲ノ爲今一回委
員會ヲ開クヘキ旨ヲ述ヘ閉會旨ヲ宣ス

(午後三時閉會)

千九百三十年「ロンド」海軍條約御批准ノ件第十三
回審査委員會

昭和五年九月二十六日(金曜日)本院事務
所ニ於テ開會

出席者

倉富議長
平沼副議長

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審査委員長

伊東顧問官

審査委員

金子顧問官

久保田顧問官

山川顧問官

黒田顧問官

田顧問官

荒井顧問官

河合顧問官

水町顧問官

二上書記官長

堀江書記官

武藤書記官

(午後一時開會)

伊東委員長開會ヲ宣ニ下審査ニ依リ本案、
逐條審議ハ之ヲ省略シタキニ曰フ述ニ審査
報告安本、審議ニ入ル

報告安本朗讀 (堀江書記官數回
朗讀)

此ノ間各委員ヨリ質問若ハ希望、陳述アリ
終ニ報告安本ヲ決定ス

伊東委員長開會ヲ宣ヌ

(午後二時開會)

No. 53

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書 第 一 二 四 號
國 際 檢 査 部 第 一 一 二 四 號

眞實及公正ニ關スル證明

余、鈴木知男ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ樞密院
事務官トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ルモノナル
コト、竝ニ該官更トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、
二四〇頁ヨリ成ル、千九百三十年ノ昭和五年ノ

附、下記題名、即チ昭和五年委員會録樞密院秘
書課ノ文書ノ保管ニ任シ居ルコトラ茲ニ證明ス。
余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ
ルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類
及ビ彙ノ一部ナルコトラ證明ス。（若シアラベ彙番
號又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ彙ニ於ケル該文書
ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ） 樞密院

1124 cert-1

11214 cert-2

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／十月一日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名は 鈴木 知 男 印

右ノ者ノ公的資格 樞密院事務官

証 人 J, A. Curtis 2dLt

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、ジョン・エー・カーティス
余、John A, Curtis ハ、余が聯合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、茲ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ余が公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／十月一日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 欄 J. A. Curtis 2dLt

右ノ者ノ公的資格 Investigator

証 人 T/4 Takeo Toguchi